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Inequalities have been the subject of keen economic interest due to ethical and policy implications for 
the society. In fact, there is wide agreement about the fact that living in a more egalitarian society leads 
to better social outcomes. However, on the other side, since most of the inequality is generated within 
the labour market there are discording opinions about the possibility of public intervention in the 
contemporary market economies (Machin 1997, Piketty and Saez, 2006). To make this picture even more 
multifaceted, related to economic inequality there is overwhelming evidence on the socioeconomic 
gradient in health. Indeed, economists have deeply investigated the two-way relationships between 
income and health and tried to disentangle the main mechanisms of transmissions (Deaton 2003). 
However, most of the findings rely on descriptive studies or analysis “at the mean”. With the aim of 
providing causal evidence and contributing to this long-standing strand of literature, this thesis analyses 
distributional aspect of income, focusing on the top tail of income distribution and in particular on those 
individuals who get high earnings in the labour market: the so-called working super-rich. Moreover, it 
investigates the socioeconomic gradient in health both in the top tails and in the rest of the distribution. 
The thesis consists of three chapters.  
The first chapter focuses on the determinants that allow some individuals to receive extraordinary 
earnings in labour markets compared to their peers, i.e. CEO or the superstars of sport, music and 
cinema. Specifically, it empirically analyses the effects of performance, popularity and bargaining power 
on the earnings of the universe of football players of Italian Serie A. The reasons are multiple. First, 
exploiting the possibility of having a perfect match employer-employee. Second, a longitudinal dataset 
with detailed information about the football players of Italian Serie A. Lastly, the fact that in Italy football 
players and managers represent the 20% of top 500 earners. On a methodological point of view, unlike 
previous analyses that are essentially based on cross-sectional data, disposing of panel data allows to 
investigate the returns of performance, popularity and bargaining power while controlling for players and 
team unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, I employ the Unconditional Quantile Regression approach 
developed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) to estimate the impact of a marginal change in the 
determinants of earnings on their entire distribution. This is relevant because players’ earnings exhibit a 
large dispersion around the mean and investigating the role of the determinants is especially interesting 
at the top of the earnings distribution, where superstar effects should more clearly manifest. Main results 
show that all the aforementioned factors significantly affect the players’ earnings. However, the analysis 
“beyond the mean” reveals that the role played by popularity increases at the top of earnings distribution 
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being the main determinant of the “superstars”. These results challenge the interpretations of 
extraordinary earnings based only on very talented workers who “win and take all”. 
As mentioned above, labour market seems a fertile ground for the escalation of contemporary society’s 
extreme inequalities. Thus, understanding how the “working super-rich” respond to health shocks can 
be a key element of these dynamics. The second chapter of this thesis aims at providing evidence of the 
relationship between health shocks and labour market outcomes, focusing on those in the top tail of 
earnings distribution. Therefore, the dataset presented above has been enriched with data about the 
nature and the incidence of the injuries suffered by the universe of Serie A football players. In particular, 
in this chapter, I exploit traumatic injuries as exogenous variation in professional football players’ health 
to provide estimates of the causal impact of a health shock on two main labour market outcomes: the 
annual net wages and the probability of changing the terms of the contract between the employer (the 
club) and the employee (the player).  
 The empirical approach employs panel fixed effects models combined with an IV strategy, which uses 
the average number of yellow cards received by the team as an instrument. Main results show that 
working super-rich are not immune to economics consequences of health shocks. In fact, injuries reduce 
the net wage in the following season by around 12%. This result is mainly driven by precautionary reasons 
due to the club’s concern about depreciation in the player’s human capital rather than by a direct effect 
of the shock on the player’s productivity. 
Thus, the second chapter contributes to the existing literature by providing original findings that can be 
summarised as follows. Firstly, it provides causal evidence of the relationship between health shocks and 
labour market outcomes. Secondly, it focuses on the consequences of health shocks for those on top 
incomes, for whom there is scant evidence so far. Lastly, it allows for a deeper analysis of the main 
mechanisms of the health shock, disentangling the effect mediated through the player’s performance and 
the one generated by human capital depreciation, inducing the club, to offer a lower wage for 
precautionary reasons. 
The third and last chapter carry on the emphasis on inequality and its multifaceted aspects by moving the 
focus from the top tail to the whole population. In fact, it investigates how people heterogeneously 
respond to public education policies delivering health information by using as case study the 2015 WHO 
warning about the carcinogenic effects of red meat consumption. Importantly, it exploits high frequency 
data, i.e. monthly data, about Italian households’ expenditures to identify the effect of the warning in the 
long vs. short run, for which there is no previous evidence in the literature and to document the response 
of households differing due to educational levels and health awareness. In order to identify such effect, 
I employ a Difference-in-Difference model which exploits the strong seasonality patterns in meat 
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consumption in Italy, mainly associated with culinary traditions in occasion of catholic holidays 
celebrations. The results show a general misinterpretation of the warning and a short-term fall in red 
meat consumption by around 5%. However, a long-lasting and consistent shift in red meat consumption 
is documented only among households with higher educational levels and health awareness. These 
findings highlight a brand-new driver of health-education gradient and a potential source of health 
inequalities. Finally, they have strong policy implications about the successful design of public health-
information policies, suggesting that they should be designed in a way that expose the individual to a 
constant flow of information. 
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What makes you ‘super-rich’?  







This article investigates the influence of performance, popularity and bargaining power on “super-
earnings” using a unique panel dataset of Italian football players built on various sources of data. Using 
OLS, Panel and Unconditional Quantile regression techniques, I find that detailed measures of these 
factors are all significantly associated with higher wages. Popularity dominates all the other factors at the 
right tail of earnings distribution and the agent’s power contributes mostly to allocate players in richer 
teams. These new findings challenge the interpretations of super-earnings based only on very talented 
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Since the middle of the 1970s, the share of gross personal income held by the top 1% or 0.1% of the 
population sharply increased in some developed countries, especially in the US and the UK, bringing the 
incomes of the top groups back to the levels they achieved at the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Atkinson et al. 2011). Furthermore, observing the composition of top incomes reveals a striking novelty. 
In fact, while in the past, the large majority of individuals belonging to the richest segment of the 
population included rentiers or entrepreneurs (Alvaredo et al. 2013), there has been a considerable 
increase in the number of the “working super-rich” accessing the top income bracket in recent decades. 
For instance, for the richest 1% of  the population, earnings accounted for the 46.4% of  the total in 1980 
in Italy while they accounted for 70.9% of  the total in 2008 and, similarly, among the 0.1% richest 
segment of  the population, the share of  earnings rose from 29.5% to 66.2% in the same period (Franzini 
et al. 2016). Hence, in contemporary economies, the labour market seems to be where extreme 
inequalities grow.  
The economic literature has addressed the phenomenon of the working super-rich by offering 
explanations based essentially on individual talent or popularity and, more recently, on bargaining power 
(see Section 2 for more details). The seminal works of Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985) noted the role of 
individual talent and popularity, respectively, and they argue that super-earnings emerge from fierce 
competition among the best performers in sectors where technology magnifies the earnings of the winner 
by allowing joint consumption. On the other side, more recent interpretations of the extraordinary rising 
salaries of top managers in large companies refer to power exerted by them on shareholders in contexts 
characterised by asymmetric information (Bebchuck and Fried 2003). Moreover, some other 
contributions have also noted that the superstar status might not be always related to abilities crucial for 
the specific type of performance in which individuals are involved (i.e., Franzini et al., 2016). Rather, it 
might be assimilated to a rent because notoriety and conformist behaviours by consumers assign to some 
superstars the possibility of extracting rents unrelated to their talent or their effective current productivity.  
Perhaps due to the difficulty of finding good proxies, no empirical studies – to my knowledge – have 
inquired on the joint influence of talent, popularity and bargaining power on “super-earnings”. The 
primary goal of this chapter is to fill this gap. I focus on a category of working super-rich – football 
players – who represent a consistent share of the universe of super-rich along with some heterogeneous 
professional categories, e.g., business lawyers, investment bankers, top managers working for large 
corporations, etc. (Atkinson et al. 2011). As noted by Kahn (2000), professional sport offers a unique 
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opportunity for innovative labour market research1, because several indicators about a player’s 
characteristics and performance are widely available and salaries are regularly published by the dedicated 
press.  
Moreover, the influence of talent, popularity and bargaining power on super-earnings can be easily 
discerned in professional team sports because teams also obtain returns by hiring players endowed by 
these characteristics. Indeed,  team’s owners are willing to pay talented players in order to increase both 
revenues from TV rights, tickets and merchandising and – not least – to enhance team performance. 
They are also willing to pay famous players since they can exploit their popularity by selling more tickets 
or through merchandising. In contrast, both talented players and less talented but “famous” players might 
be able to bargain a higher salary when a club’s owner exploits the threat to choose a different team. The 
influence of these factors on earnings might actually have been reinforced by the technological and 
institutional changes that occurred in Europe in recent years. On one hand, pay-TV technology and the 
internet have allowed teams to be watched by a global audience and contributed to redistributing the 
largest share of the revenues towards the most popular teams and the most talented and famous players 
(Boeri and Severgnini 2012). On the other hand, institutional changes, such as the diffusion of free agency 
– i.e., the eligibility for a player to sign with any club even when under contract to a specific team2 – and 
the Bosman ruling – which liberalised players’ markets within the European Union by removing transfer 
fees when a player wanted to change clubs when the contract had expired – allowed players to strengthen 
their bargaining power, also relying upon professional agents in order to negotiate better deals with team’s 
owners (Blair 2007, Mason 2012).  
We use a longitudinal dataset on football players3 in the Italian Premier League (Serie A) built by merging 
information from various sources of data about players’ characteristics, performance and wages. The 
Italian Premier League (Serie A) is one of the top five most followed football leagues in Europe, and 
football players represent an important share of the super-rich, i.e., in 2003, they constituted 
approximately 1/5 of the top 0.01% earners in Italy (Franzini et al. 2016).  
Additionally, due to the peculiarity of my dataset, my analysis allows us to make a number of contributions 
to the existing literature (reviewed in Section 2). First, unlike previous analyses that are essentially based 
on cross-sectional data, I can dispose of a panel dataset that allows us to investigate the returns of 
performance, popularity and bargaining power while controlling for players and team unobserved 
                                                             
1 Besides, a number of  studies use sport data to analyse various economic issues. Recent examples include Gallo et al. (2013) 
and Price and Wolfers (2010) to analyse discrimination in the labour market and Dickson et al. (2016) to analyse determinants 
of  domestic violence. 
2 Zimbalist (1992) finds that players who are not eligible to become free agents suffer a higher monopsonistic exploitation 
(about 38%) by teams than their eligible colleagues (18%). 
3 Throughout this paper, I use the words “football” and “soccer”. 
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heterogeneity. This approach permits us to establish a more causal link between determinants and 
earnings. Second, I use the Unconditional Quantile Regression approach developed by Firpo, Fortin and 
Lemieux (2009) to estimate the impact of a marginal change in the determinants of earnings on their 
entire distribution. This is relevant because players’ earnings exhibit a large dispersion around the mean 
and investigating the role of the determinants is especially interesting at the top of the earnings 
distribution, where superstar effects should more clearly manifest. Third, I use several performance 
measures (goals, assists and average grades obtained during a season) as a proxy of talent, the number of 
yearly Google search queries made for each player as a proxy of popularity and the total market value of 
players who are represented by the same agent as a proxy of the bargaining power. In particular, unlike 
the previous literature, which usually makes use only of goals and assists as measures of performance, 
this allows us to properly evaluate the performance of all team members, including those who are not 
directly involved in goals or assists, such as midfielders or defenders. Moreover, the use of measures of 
power is new in the literature, and its role on determining player’s earnings has been unexplored so far.  
We find that all three aforementioned factors – i.e., performance, popularity and bargaining power – 
significantly affect players’ earnings. These results are driven by both a pure compositional effect (i.e., 
the allocation of players endowed by a higher talent, popularity or power in better teams) and a pure 
direct effect, as the impact of these determinants on earnings is largely significant when players and team 
unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account. Moreover, analysis ‘beyond the mean’ reveals that 
especially the role played by popularity increases at the top of earnings distribution, among those who, 
according to the terminology developed by Rosen (1981), can be named as “superstars”. These results 
challenge the interpretations of extraordinary earnings based only on very talented workers who “win 
and take all”. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the insights from the economic 
literature about possible explanations of super-earnings, briefly reviewing the contribution of sports 
economics to this literature. Section 3 presents my data and the main variables. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical methodology. In Section 5, I present the results of my empirical analysis. The last section 
summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Determinants of super-earnings: insights from the literature 
 
The evidence that a few individuals in selected professions – e.g., athletes, singers, artists, writers, CEOs, 
and lawyers – can enjoy huge salaries has been named in the economic literature as the “superstar” 
phenomenon (Rosen 1981). The economic literature has addressed this issue by offering few, and not 
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always recent, explanations that can be classified according to the role they assign to the individual’s talent 
(Rosen 1981), popularity (Adler 1985) or power (Bebchuck and Fried 2003). In this section, I offer a 
quick review of  these contributions and discuss the main empirical findings of  the literature trying to 
test these theories.  
The seminal theory of  superstar formation was provided by Rosen (1981), who showed how a small 
difference in individual productivity/talent can be magnified into huge differences in earnings, focusing 
on three main assumptions. First, consumers are able to identify who are the best performers. Second, 
they prefer to be served by “the best”, i.e., there is imperfect substitution among performers. Third, 
technology allows for joint consumption – i.e., there is no rivalry among consumers – and better 
performers can draw large audiences, for instance, in football stadiums, or via TV or selling their books 
or albums worldwide, with a cost of  production largely independent of  the size of  the audience. Krueger 
(2005), for instance, shows that these are salient features of  the market for rock concerts and among the 
leading explanations for the high prices and revenues of  music shows by superstar musicians. According 
to Rosen (1981), super-earnings depend exclusively on talent: in sectors such as professional sports 
markets, show business and many entertainment services (Rosen and Sanderson 2001), the most talented 
individual wins fierce competition and, independent of  the size of  the difference in productivity with the 
losers (that can also be very small), the winner takes most of  the pie (as in the “winner takes all” markets 
discussed by Frank and Cook, 1995).  
A second theory was proposed by Adler (1985), who argued that superstars might emerge among equally talented 
performers due to the positive network externalities of popularity. While, on the supply side, Rosen (1981) and 
Adler (1985) agree on the necessity of technologies allowing large economies of scale, Rosen (1981) considers 
talent to be observable without cost by all consumers, while Adler (1985) notes that talent is a hidden characteristic 
that has to be discovered through personal and interpersonal learning processes. Actually, the appreciation of a 
particular performer (e.g., football player, singer, or artist) grows with the knowledge consumers have acquired 
about him through conversations with other people. In fact, as a performer’s popularity increases, it becomes easier 
to find other fans, because, due to searching costs, consumers are better off patronising the most popular star as 
long as others are not perceived as clearly superior. According to Adler (1985), luck determines who among equally 
talented performers will snowball into a star, but talent is an essential prerequisite to becoming a superstar. 
However, Adler (2006) states that the likelihood of becoming a superstar could also be affected by the investments 
performers make in their popularity, through advertising or appearing on talk shows, in tabloids, in magazines and 
on social networks.  
Similarly, Franzini et al. (2016) recently argued that superstar status might not always be related to abilities crucial 
for the specific type of performance in which individuals are involved and might be assimilated to a rent. Especially 
for sport and show business stars, very high earnings can be generated by providing services through activities in 
which one does not necessarily excel. The well-known phenomenon of celebrity endorsement, indeed, guarantees 
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very high revenues from advertising to a star. Furthermore, apart from mechanisms highlighted by Adler (1985), 
when information on individual abilities (e.g., of athletes, singers, managers and professionals) are largely imperfect, 
notoriety and conformist behaviours by consumers assign to some superstars the possibility of extracting rents 
unrelated to their talent or their effective current productivity. For instance, this may occur when, due to proven 
success in the past, popularity fails to provide information on current abilities, which can fade more quickly than 
fame4. Moreover, additional forms of rents can be gained by some superstars, influencing preferences and choices 
of consumers through advertising or exploiting popularity offered by the media. Thus, less talented individuals 
might also acquire popularity, challenging the view that superstars always emerge among the most talented. 
As a third explanation, extraordinary earnings might be associated with the bargaining power exerted by superstars. 
For instance, managers and CEOs in large companies might be able to fix their own remuneration independent of 
productivity, exploiting asymmetric information with respect to shareholders (Bebchuck and Fried 2003, Bivens 
and Mishel 2013). Furthermore, players in team sports can achieve wage increases by threatening the club owner 
with acceptance of a better deal from another team (Blair 2012).  
A number of empirical contributions have tried to investigate the determinants of super-earnings, and, with few 
exceptions, mostly rely on sport statistics, as mentioned in the introduction (see, e.g., Frick 2007 and Deutscher 
and Buschemann 2016 for a survey)5. However, most studies focusing on sport economics issues investigate 
players’ characteristics that are associated with higher wages (e.g., the player’s position, the footedness, the age and 
the experience in the League, or performance measures, such as tackles, assists or goals in soccer or points scored 
or rebounds in basketball) and are based on cross-sectional data and use OLS Mincerian (Mincer 1974) regressions 
or quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett 1978). 
Fewer studies explicitly test theoretical predictions, i.e., try to investigate the role of performance and popularity 
in super-earnings. Lucifora and Simmons (2003), among others, found evidence to support Rosen’s explanation 
of superstars in the Italian soccer league, as they find that talent, measured by performance indicators, exercises 
significant influence on the skewness of the earnings distribution. More recently, other authors have studied the 
role of either talent or popularity in shaping players’ earnings in sports, finding controversial results. Treme and 
Allen (2009) focused on drafting of rosters in the US National Basketball Association (NBA) and found a 
significant effect of both performance before being drafted and the media exposure received by players on entry 
earnings. Franck and Nuesch (2012) found that both talent- and nonperformance-related popularity increase the 
market value of soccer stars, especially at the top of the distribution; Lehmann and Schulze (2008) showed, instead, 
that neither performance nor popularity explain salaries of soccer superstars in the top quantiles6.  
                                                             
4 Mullin and Dunn (2002) described the star’s popularity of a baseball player as an intangible characteristic coming mainly 
from reputation based on past performance, which attracts fans who pay to see these stars, even when their playing 
performance is no better than mediocre.  
5 A significant exception is represented, for instance, by Krueger (2005) who analyses the market for superstar musicians and 
finds a significantly positive association between star quality measured by the number of millimeters of print columns devoted 
to each artist in The Rolling Stone Encyclopedia of Rock & Roll and the prices and revenues of the music shows.  
6 Following a different empirical strategy, Brandes et al. (2008) compared talent- and popularity-based explanations; more 
specifically, they compared star attraction of  national superstars and of  so-called ‘‘local heroes’’ in the German soccer league 
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To the best of my knowledge, no studies have tested the influence of an agent’s bargaining power on earnings and 
none of the studies reviewed in this section has jointly analysed the role of performance (as a proxy of talent), 
popularity and bargaining power on superstar earnings. As mentioned in the introduction, the main goal of this 
chapter is to fill this gap. 
 
3. Data and main variables 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on an original dataset recording earnings, performance and other 
characteristics of  football players of  the Italian Premier League (Serie A). The data come from various 
sources and record longitudinal information for players, teams and agents7. I considered 469 players who 
appeared in Serie A in the 2013-2014 season as the starting sample – excluding goalkeepers, thus following 
a common approach in the sport economics literature (e.g., Lucifora and Simmons 2003) – and followed 
these players from the 2010-2011 season to the 2014-2015 season. This leads to a panel dataset composed 
of  1,586 observations. The panel is unbalanced because, due to the system of  clubs’ promotion and 
relegation between Serie A and Serie B and players’ transfers across national and international leagues, 
there is a large turnover of  players in the league.8  
We built the dataset in order to observe all factors that might influence players’ earnings, controlling for 
club and player characteristics: i.e., talent, proxied by measures of  performance, popularity and bargaining 
power. 
Data on players’ yearly salaries – recorded net of  taxes and excluding possible bonuses – are taken from 
the annual report published at the beginning of  each season by the most-read Italian sport newspaper, 
La Gazzetta dello Sport. Data about players’ characteristics (e.g., age, position in the pitch, and international 
caps) and performances (i.e., goals and assists – decisive passes leading to a goal – during a season) are 
extracted from the websites transfermarkt.com and soccerways.com. As a further performance variable, Ialso 
included the average seasonal grade assigned to players in each played match by the three most popular 
Italian sport newspapers – La Gazzetta dello sport, Il corriere dello sport and Tuttosport – where the grade varies 
between 1 (very poor performance) and 10 (excellent), even if, in most cases, journalists use a range 
                                                             
– defined as the most valued players of  teams in which no national superstars play – and find that superstars attract fans by 
outstanding field performances, whereas local heroes facilitate fan support by mere popularity. 
7Ialso collected information on teams’ economic performance, recorded in balance sheets, annually approved by the clubs’ 
boards of  directors and published on the official websites. However, I prefer to include team fixed effects rather than specific 
values for team variables in my baseline estimates, as these variables are rather time invariant. Results, available upon request 
by the authors, show that my main findings do not change at all ifIreplace team fixed effects with values for a set of  team 
variables. 
8 The Italian Premier league is composed of  20 teams, and at the end of  the season, the last three clubs in the table are 
relegated and substituted by the first three clubs in the second division (Serie B). 
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between 4 and 8.9 As mentioned in the introduction, this process allows us to measure the performance 
of  players not directly involved in goals and assists, such as midfielders and defenders.  
Concerning popularity, I use as a proxy the number of  Google search queries made each year for each 
player.10 As a proxy of  players’ bargaining power, I rely on information on the total market value of  
players who are represented by the same agent (provided by the website transfermrkt.com), assuming that 
an agent with a richer portfolio is better able to bargain a good deal with the club’s owner. According to 
Italian rules, football players can be represented by professional agents enrolled in a specific register or 
by a close relative. The relationship between the player and the agent is generally very stable over the 
time. Actually, an agent generally follows the player's interest over his entire career, with changes in agents 
being quite rare, at least in relation to my period of  observation (five seasons). Therefore, the proxy of  
agent bargaining power is, in fact, time invariant in my dataset.11 
The contract between the team and the player ensures the right for the team to enjoy the sports 
performance of  the player and to involve him in public events related to the sponsors and the club ’s 
image. On the other hand, the player is generally paid with a fixed salary and, occasionally, a variable that 
depends on the team and individual results during the football season. In this chapter, I consider only the 
fixed part of  the salary.  
Contracts between the team and the player can last for 5 years at most. Unfortunately, I do not have 
information about contract length in my dataset (neither the original nor the residual duration). However, 
evidence suggests that contracts in the Italian Serie A usually last for 5 years, with the exception of  young 
and old players, that are often characterized by shorter-term arrangements (Carmichael et al. 2012)12. 
Contracts can be renegotiated even before the expiry date (often to contrast claims by other teams) and 
                                                             
9 Other recent papers in the sport economics literature use a player’s grade as a proxy of  performance, e.g., Bryson et al. 
(2012), Buraimo et al. (2015) and Deutscher and Buschemann (2016). 
10 To have a coherent value for each player, the data have been collected the same day for each one, typing “name-surname-
team”. I also collected data about the number of  followers each player has on Twitter, butIdid not rely on this measure because 
only the most popular players are on Twitter. The few studies that have investigated the link between football players’ 
popularity and earnings use proxies based on players’ quotations in newspapers (Brandes et al. 2008, Lehmann and Schulze 
2008) or press publicity (Franck and Nuesch 2012). 
11 Unfortunately, available statistics on professional agents (i.e., on the site transfermarket.com used for my analysis) do not 
include any information on the length of  the contract as it is actually a part of  the private contract between the player and the 
agent. However, I do not observe any change in the agent-player relationship in my data and this might be explained by a 
number of  reasons. First, because my data refer to the period before April 2015, when, for the first time, a maximum length 
of  two years has been set by the Italian Football Federation (FIGC) to the contract between the player and the agent with the 
aim of  introducing more competition in the market for agents. The introduction of  a maximum length of  2 years suggests a 
length well above this threshold in the period to which my analysis refers to (i.e. before 2015). Secondly, contracts between 
agents and players both before and after 2015 include the payment of  a fee in case of  anticipate resolution without a legitimate 
reason and this obviously creates a cost on both parts to the dissolution of  the contract. Last but not least, the average 
observational period for each player is in fact of  3 years in my data and this is due to the system of  relegation/promotion and 
to some cases of  player’s transfer to other leagues (especially as concerns foreign players). 
12 Consistently with Carmichael et al. (2012), the inclusion of  a careful control for the age of  the player (age and age squared 
variables) in all my estimates allows us to partially take into account the effect of  contract length on earnings. However, a 
precise estimate of  the relationship between contract length and players’ earnings, as that performed by Buraimo et al (2015) 
for the German Bundesliga, cannot be carried out through my dataset. 
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in some cases automatic earnings increases are established by the contract according, e.g., to the number 
of  games played during a season. When looking at players’ earnings changes overtime – a poor proxy of  
the contract length as explained above – my data show that approximately 63% of  players receive a wage 
different from that of  the previous season (56% if  I exclude those moving to another team). 
In addition to the proxies of  individual talent, popularity and bargaining power, I also included in my 
dataset several variables that are used as controls in my estimations (see Sections 4 and 5) and that are 
presented, along with some summary statistics of  all variables, in the next section.  
 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
The full list of  variables included in my dataset along with mean values and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 1. On average, the net annual earnings of  football players in the Italian Premier league 
amount to approximately 875,000 Euros, but the standard deviation is very high (912,000 Euros). In 
addition, proxies of  popularity and bargaining power are characterised by a very high standard deviation 
that is much higher than the mean of  the variable (Table 1). On average, players in my sample score 1.93 
goals per year (standard deviation is 3.50) and 1.28 assists (standard deviation is 2.04), while the mean 
grade assigned by journalists to players’ performances in each match is 5.77 (standard deviation is 0.41). 
[Table 1 approximately here] 
The large dispersion in players’ annual net wages clearly emerges when values of percentiles of earnings 
distribution and ratios among percentiles are shown (Table 2). Even if almost the whole body of football 
players earns a very high wage (the 10th percentile earns 200,000 Euros per year), a group of “superstars” 
clearly emerges: the top 10% earn at least 2 million Euros per year and the top 5% earn at least 5 times 
more than the median earner (Table 2). Therefore, the Gini index within the group of football players in 
my sample is very high: it is only slightly below 0.50, while, for comparison, one may consider that the 
Gini of net annual earnings from dependent employment was in Italy 0.298 in 2014 according to EU-
SILC 2015 data (0.239 if only full-time employees working for the whole year are considered).13 
[Table 2 approximately here] 
                                                             
13 However, my estimates of  the Gini index are in line with results found for other soccer leagues. For instance, Franck and 
Nuesch (2006) find a Gini of  0.56 for the German Bundesliga in the 2004-2005 season (but referring to market values that 
include also bonuses and potential transfer fees and are then likely to be more dispersed than wages), while Send (2016) finds 
a Gini of  0.51 considering the earnings of  the German Bundesliga players in the 2014-2015 season. A higher inequality 
emerges instead in the US Major Soccer League: Reilly and Witt find a Gini of  0.628 in 2007 (0.569 excluding from the 
computation Beckham who was the most paid player at that time).  
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Figure 1 shows the non-parametric estimate of  the overall salary distribution for the pivotal 2013-2014 
season. A very asymmetric distribution emerges, with a long right tail, which indicates the presence of  a 
restricted number of  players who earn very high salaries compared to the rest of  the distribution. As 
mentioned, this is consistent with the “superstar” phenomenon discussed in Section 2.  
[Figure 1 approximately here] 
Apart from players, a large heterogeneity also characterises the Serie A teams. As stated in the following 
sections, the achievement of  higher salaries by talented, popular or powerful players can be mediated by 
purchases by the richest teams, which can afford higher wage bills. Indeed, total wage bills hugely differ 
among clubs who participate in the Italian football Premier League (Figure 2) and because economic 
performances by teams and revenues from game tickets and TV rights are very unequally distributed 
across teams (Table 3). 
[Table 3 approximately here] 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
Our empirical analysis relies on two main estimation techniques. I first assess the impact of  main 
determinants of  earnings ‘at the mean’ of  the earnings distribution using both pooled OLS and panel 
estimators. Second, It est the impact of  the determinants along the entire earnings distribution using 
unconditional quantile regressions.  
 
4.1 OLS and panel analysis 
Consistent with the empirical literature on athlete earnings, I estimate the following augmented Mincerian 
equation:  
𝑳𝒏(𝑾𝒊𝒕) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝑺𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (𝟏) 
where the dependent variable is the log of  yearly net player’s earnings in season t, 𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒊𝒕−𝟏 is the vectors 
of  proxy variables for players’ performance in the previous season (i.e., goals, assists and average grades 
during the season), and 𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕−𝟏 and 𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕−𝟏, respectively, refer to proxies of  popularity and 
bargaining power, measured before the season starts. 𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 represents a set of  several lagged time-varying 
and time-invariant player’s characteristics that I include as controls in my estimates, namely, age and age 
squared, the number of  caps with the national team and with the under 21 national team during the 
previous season and on the whole during one’s career, the number of  minutes played during the previous 
season, dummies for the position in the pitch (distinguishing defenders, midfielders and forwards), 
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dummies for citizenship (distinguishing Italian, EU and extra-EU players), a dummy for players who are 
captains of  their teams and season dummies. All the regressors are in lagged values in order to rule out 
potential reverse causality issues. 
As an additional model, I also estimate equation (1), adding team fixed effects to covariates (i.e., dummies 
for teams in season t), in order to capture possible heterogeneity in earnings related to the club’s 
characteristics (e.g., prestige, wealth). 
𝑳𝒏(𝑾𝒊𝒕) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑷𝒆𝒓𝒇𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒐𝒑𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟑𝑷𝒐𝒘𝒆𝒓𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝑺𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝝑𝑻𝒆𝒂𝒎𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (𝟐) 
Equation (2) is useful to observe whether performance, popularity and bargaining power exert a “direct” 
influence on earnings or whether the influence of  these three factors is merely compositional, or 
“indirect” – i.e., it is mediated by the likelihood of  more talented, popular and powerful payers to belong 
to a richer team. For instance, popularity or an agent’s power could allow players to achieve higher 
earnings, allowing them to be purchased by a better team, without then exerting a further “direct” effect 
within teams. Henceforth, estimates with team fixed effects can be interpreted as the estimate of  a “within 
team” effect on earnings due to performance, popularity and power. 
In order to eliminate from my estimates the possible confounding factor due to the correlation between 
performances and the other two determinants of  super-earnings (i.e., performance-related media 
coverage and/or the capacity of  most talented players to be represented by the most powerful agents), 
as suggested by Franck and Nuesch (2012), I also use additional specifications of  equations (1) and (2) 
in which I replace popularity and bargaining power with the residuals of  two OLS estimates where these 
two measures are regressed on my performance variables (grades, goals and assists), plus age, age squared 
and season fixed effects.  
We estimate equations (1) and (2) with OLS and panel estimators and considering random (RE) and fixed 
effects (FE) models. As known, fixed effect estimates allow us to take into account the effect of  time-
invariant players’ unobservable characteristics (e.g., charisma, innate ability and ability to interact with 
other players) that could otherwise bias the estimates of  the effect of  my main variables of  interest on 
players’ salaries. Importantly, fixed effect estimates do not rely on the rather strong assumption of  no 
correlation between individual time-invariant characteristics and earnings. However, I cannot rely entirely 
on fixed effects estimates in my context, as bargaining power is essentially time invariant because players 
change agents very rarely during their careers (as mentioned in Section 3). For this reason, I will employ 
fixed effect estimates to assess the impact of  time-varying determinants (i.e., popularity and 
performance), while I will use both pooled OLS estimates and random effect estimates (which rely on 
the assumption of  no correlation between time-invariant player characteristics and earnings) to assess the 
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role of  time-unvarying determinants (agent’s power). However, all techniques lead us to draw similar 
conclusions with respect to the impact of  time-varying determinants, thus providing robustness to my 
empirical strategy (see Section 5 for more details).  
 
4.2 Unconditional Quantile Regression 
To assess how the influence of  the main determinants of  super-earnings change along the earnings 
distribution – and especially at the top of  the distribution, where “superstars” should lie –I apply models 
(1) and (2) on the pooled sample of  players using the Unconditional Quantile Regression (UQR) 
approach, also called the Recentered Influence Function (RIF) method, proposed by Firpo et al. (2009).  
The key advantage of  the UQR approach over other distributional methods (i.e., the conditional quantile 
regression proposed by Koenker and Bassett 1978)14 is that it allows us to analyse the relationship between 
covariates and the unconditional distribution of  earnings. This possibility occurs because the UQR 
method provides a linear approximation of  the unconditional quantiles of  the dependent variable. The 
law of  iterated expectations can be applied to the quantile being approximated and used to estimate the 
marginal effect of  a covariate through a simple regression of  a function of  the outcome variable, the 
Recentered Influence Function, on the covariates.  
In my setting, the RIF of  earnings is estimated directly from the data by first computing the sample 
quantile 𝒒 and then estimating the density of  the distribution of  income at that quantile using kernel 
density methods. Then, for a given observed quantile 𝒒𝝉, a RIF is generated, which can take one of  two 
values depending on whether the observation’s value of  the outcome variable is less than or equal to the 
observed quantile: 
𝑹𝑰𝑭 (𝑾; 𝒒𝝉) = 𝒒𝝉 +
𝝉 − 𝟏[𝑾 ≤ 𝒒𝝉]
𝒇𝒘(𝒒𝝉)
 (𝟑) 
where 𝒒𝝉 is the observed sample quantile of  earnings, 𝝉 − 𝟏[𝑾 ≤ 𝒒𝝉] is an indicator variable equal to 
one if  the observation's value of  earnings is less than or equal to the observed quantile and zero 
otherwise, while 𝒇𝒘(𝒒𝝉)is the estimated kernel density of  earnings at the 𝝉𝒕𝒉 quantile. 
The RIF defined in equation (3) is then used as a dependent variable in an OLS regression on the 
covariates defined in equations (1) and (2). In practice, this amounts to estimate a rescaled linear 
                                                             
14 Determinants of  super-earnings in professional soccer are estimated through conditional quantile regressions by Lehmann 
and Schulze (2008), Franck and Nuesch (2012) and Deutsher and Buschemann (2016), while Deutscher et al. (2016) make use 
of  unconditional quantile regressions. 
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probability model (Jones et al. 2015). Indeed, the unconditional quantile of  earnings 𝒒𝝉, may be obtained 
as follows:  
𝒒𝝉 = 𝑬𝒙 [𝑬[𝑹𝑰?̂?(𝑾; 𝒒𝝉)|𝑿]] (𝟒) 
where 𝑹𝑰?̂?(𝑾; 𝒒𝝉)|𝑿 is the estimate of  RIF as defined in equation (3), conditional on covariates X. 
Thanks to this linear approximation, it is now possible to apply the law of  iterated expectations. Thus, 
𝒒𝝉 can be written as 
𝒒𝝉 = 𝑬[𝑿]𝜹?̂? (5) 
where 𝜹?̂? is the coefficient of  the unconditional quantile regression. This linearisation allows the 
estimation of  the marginal effect of  a change in distribution of  covariates X on the unconditional 




5.1 OLS estimates 
In Table 4, I report OLS estimates of  equations (1) and (2), respectively, i.e., without and with team fixed 
effects.15 The two equations are estimated including both rough measures of  popularity and power (in 
the “baseline” model) and including nonperformance-related measures of  popularity and power, as 
explained in Section 4. All coefficients are expressed in terms of  one standard deviation (S.D.) of  the 
variable. Therefore, with the dependent variable expressed in logs, estimated coefficients indicate the 
percentage change in annual net wages associated with a one-standard-deviation increase in the 
independent variable. 
Estimates of equation (1) (columns 1 and 3, Table 4) show that all measures of performance, popularity 
and bargaining power exert a largely positive and highly statistically significant influence on earnings. In 
the baseline model (column 1, Table 4), for instance, a one-S.D. increase in goals, assists and mean grade 
during the previous season is associated with a wage increase of 11.4%, 3.4% and 6.3%, respectively. 
Likewise, a one-S.D. increase in proxies for popularity and bargaining power leads to a wage increase of 
16% and 8.1%, respectively.  
                                                             
15 Note that, for the sake of  space, in this article, I show only estimated coefficients of  my variables of  interest (i.e., proxies 
of  performance, popularity and power). Detailed estimates including all covariates are available upon request by the authors. 
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Interestingly, results are similar in magnitude and have the same level of statistical significance regardless 
of whether rough or non-performance-related measures of popularity and power are used as 
determinants of earnings.16 
[Table 4 approximately here] 
The size of the estimated coefficients decreases when team fixed effects are controlled for (columns 2 
and 4, Table 4), but all coefficients remain statistically significant in models where nonperformance-
related popularity and power measures are used. These results suggest that a pure compositional effect is 
at work – favouring players endowed by better talent, popularity or power to belong to a richer team – 
but all the determinants also have a direct effect on earnings (i.e., a “within team” effect). The largest 
drop in coefficients when team fixed effects are included refers to the proxy of bargaining power: the 
influence on annual net earnings of a one-S.D. increase in the player’s portfolio owned by the agent drops 
from 8.1% to 2.1% when team fixed effects are added to the covariates. This is consistent with the role 
of the agent, which is essentially that of allocating the player to the team by guaranteeing the highest 
possible wage to the player.  
 
5.2 Panel estimates 
In table 5, I report random effects estimates according to all specifications discussed so far. The estimates 
basically confirm the results obtained through OLS, signalling that all three determinants of super-
earnings also play a significant role when unobserved time-invariant individual characteristics (assumed 
to be independent with earnings, as in RE models) are taken into account (Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5). 
Moreover, the results are stable when “within team” estimates are carried out (Columns 2 and 4) and 
with both raw and nonperformance-related measures of popularity and bargaining power.  
[Table 5 approximately here] 
In Table 6, I report fixed effects estimates that do not include a time-invariant power variable, but do 
not rely on the assumption of no correlation between time-invariant individual characteristics and 
earnings, as discussed in Section 3. Fixed effect results differ with respect to the OLS and RE estimates 
in two ways. First, the size of all estimated coefficients decreases. Furthermore, among performance 
variables, both mean grade and goals are positively associated with earnings, but only goals remain 
                                                             
16  The sample size of  the regressions is lower than the total sample size because, using lagged covariates, I cannot include in 
the regressions those players who play for the first time in Italian Serie A in a certain season (for instance, foreign players have 
missing values for the first season they play in Italy). 
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statistically significant. Additionally, the proxy of popularity remains statistically significant and its size 
does not change when team fixed effects are added to the regression. For instance, according to the 
specification in Column 3, I find that a one-S.D. increase in the proxy of popularity brings about a 
remarkable 2.7% increase in earnings, while a one-S.D. increase in scored goals leads to a 5.0% increase 
in annual wages.  
[Table 6 approximately here] 
Overall, these results suggest that unobserved time-invariant player characteristics have a significant 
effect on earnings, and the size of the determinants of earnings is actually smaller when these 
characteristics are taken into account. However, both within-individual changes over time in goals – 
among other performance variables – and popularity highly contribute to increasing earnings when 
unobserved heterogeneity at both individual and team levels is taken into account. This suggests a 
robust causal link between these determinants and earnings.  
 
5.3 Additional Checks 
In this section, I perform a number of additional checks to test the robustness of my proxy of the agent’s 
bargaining power. In fact, one peculiarity of the football market is that the agent negotiates the individual 
contract, so the single player might get benefits from being represented by a more powerful agent 
according to his client’s portfolio. However, agents can have different business strategies in building their 
portfolio. To take into account this aspect, I exploit all the information available in my dataset by adding 
a number of additional and alternative measures of bargaining power in my baseline estimates. Results of 
these checks for both OLS and random effect specifications are reported in Tables A1 and A2, in the 
Appendix, respectively.  
Firstly, in columns 1-2, I account for the size of agent’s portfolio, adding the number of players 
represented by each agent as an additional control variable. The results related to my main variable 
(aggregated market value) are qualitatively unaffected, while the magnitude is only a bit higher compared 
to baseline estimates. The coefficient related to the number of players is very close to zero and barely 
statistically significant. Interestingly, in both OLS and random effect estimates, the effect of the aggregate 
market value is lower when team fixed effects are included as a control. This is in line with my baseline 
results and confirms the main role of the agent that is the one of allocating players to teams by 
guaranteeing the highest possible wage to the player.  
Secondly, in columns 3-4, as an alternative bargaining power measure, I use the mean market value of 
the players in the agent’s portfolio. This variable combines both information discussed above, i.e. the 
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aggregate market value divided by the number of players represented by the same agent. Here again, my 
results are substantially unaffected and exhibit the same pattern discussed above when team fixed effects 
are also included.  
Lastly, in columns 5-6, I account for the agent’s portfolio diversification, adding a measure of the payers’ 
value dispersion as an additional control. Unfortunately, for what concerns the market value, I only have 
aggregated data for each agent and detailed information on the portfolio are not available for the period 
to which my analysis refers to. However, I use the standard deviation of the wages of the Italian Serie A 
players represented by the same agent as an additional control. This measure is likely to capture agent’s 
portfolio diversification, since the wage is a good proxy of player’s market value (as shown by other 
papers, such as Forrest and Simmons 2002, Torgler and Schmidt 2007, Franck and Nüesch 2012). Also 
in this case, the inclusion of this additional control does not affect substantially my results. Only the 
aggregated market variable turns to be poorly statistical significant when team fixed effects are also 
included in the regression, in line with the results found above. The coefficient of this additional control 
is instead positive and significant meaning that portfolio diversification of the agent –other than 
aggregated portfolio value- is also positively correlated with player’s earnings. 
 
5.4 UQR estimates 
Table 7 and Figure 3 show the results of  UQR according to the specification of  equation (1), while Table 
8 and Figure 4 show UQR estimates of  the specification including team fixed effects (as in equation (2)). 
Tables 7 and 8 show estimated coefficients at the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 95th percentiles of  the 
earnings distribution, respectively, while figures 3 and 4 show coefficients at every 5 percentiles of  the 
distribution. For the sake of  brevity, I show only the results of  models where nonperformance-related 
measures of  popularity and power are employed (alternative estimates are shown in Tables A3 and A4 in 
the Appendix and lead to similar results). 
Table 7 and Figure 3 show that talent, popularity and bargaining power remain substantially positive and 
significant along the whole earnings distribution, and their size grows along the distribution. However, 
focusing on top percentiles, where superstar effects should more clearly manifest, the increasing pattern 
of  popularity coefficients along the distribution must be emphasised. Popularity dominates all the other 
covariates in the top tail of  the distribution and reaches its peak at the 95th percentile, where a one-S.D. 
increase in popularity is associated with a 35.4% increase in annual earnings in the subsequent season. 
The effect of  goals and grades on earnings is rather constant, and a one-S.D. increase in goals is associated 
with a 21.0% increase in annual earnings at the 95th percentile of  the earnings distribution. Conversely, 
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bargaining power exerts a large and significant influence on earnings only up to the 75th percentile of  the 
distribution, and it is not significantly associated with earnings after this threshold. 
[Table 7 approximately here] 
[Figure 3 approximately here] 
Table 8 and Figure 4 show essentially the same pattern depicted in Table 7 and Figure 3, but with one 
important difference. Indeed, the inclusion of  team fixed effects greatly reduces the influence of  the 
agent’s power, whose effect turns to be not statistically significant just after the median of  the earnings 
distribution. A similar pattern, only observed at the mean of  the earnings distribution, was also found in 
OLS estimates (shown in Section 5.1). Conversely, the influence of  popularity is also large and significant 
when team fixed effects are included in the regression and its influence on earnings grows along their 
distribution: a one-S.D. increase in popularity is associated with a 4.1% increase in earnings at the median 
of  the earnings distribution and with a 31.9% increase at the 95th percentile. 
[Table 8 approximately here] 
[Figure 4 approximately here] 
Overall, UQR estimates generally support the results obtained from the OLS and panel regressions when 
these are evaluated at the mean of  the distribution. However, UQR regression results reveal that the 
relative weight of  these factors changes along the distribution of  earnings, especially at the top tail of  






The economic literature has addressed the phenomenon of  the working super-rich by offering 
explanations based on individuals’ talent, popularity or power. However, due to the difficulty of  finding 
good proxies, no empirical studies have inquired about the joint influence of  these factors on “super-
earnings”. Following suggestions by Kahn (2000) to exploit sports data in order to carry out innovative 
labour market research, I use a unique panel dataset on earnings and several characteristics of  all Italian 
Serie A football players to investigate the joint effect of  performance, popularity and bargaining power 
on earnings. An original feature of  my dataset is the use of  new and detailed information on players’ 
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performance (based on the goals, assists and grades given by leading Italian newspapers), popularity 
(based on the yearly searches on Google) and bargaining power (based on an agent’s client portfolio), 
while the longitudinal nature of  my dataset allows us to investigate the determinants of  earnings while 
controlling for time-invariant players and club characteristics. Moreover, I use various estimation 
techniques to assess these relationships and, in particular, I employ Unconditional Quantile Regression 
to assess the role of  the determinants along the entire distribution of  players’ earnings. 
We find that proxies of  talent, popularity and bargaining power are all significantly associated with higher 
earnings. However, I find that the relative weight of  these factors on earnings greatly varies when 
considering a compositional vs a pure direct effect, and at different points along the earnings distribution. 
my main findings can be summarised in greater detail as follows.  
First, according to my OLS estimates, I find that the leading determinants of  earnings are represented 
by performance and popularity. A S.D. increase in goals, assists and mean grade during the previous 
season is associated with a wage increase of  11.4%, 3.4% and 6.3%, respectively. Similarly, a one-S.D. 
increase in annual searches of  the player on Google is associated with a yearly earnings premium of  
approximately 16%. As a third determinant, I find that a one-S.D. increase in the agent’s client portfolio, 
as a proxy of  higher bargaining power, leads to an increase in earnings of  approximately 8%, on average.  
Second, I find that these results are partly due to a compositional effect – i.e., allocation of  players 
endowed with greater talent, popularity and power to better teams – and partly by a direct influence on 
earnings. In particular, I find that an agent’s market power is important, especially in allocating players to 
teams guaranteeing higher wages – a compositional effect – while its effect is very small when team fixed 
characteristics are taken into account.  
Third, panel fixed effect estimates suggest that time-invariant individual characteristics have a significant 
effect on earnings, while within-individual changes over time in goals – among other performance 
variables – and popularity also highly contribute to increasing earnings. This suggests a robust causal link 
between these determinants and earnings.  
Finally, I find through UQR that the relative weight of  these determinants on earnings highly varies along 
the distribution of  earnings, while analysis only at the mean seems to underestimate the differences in 
the wage structure between ‘normal’ players and ‘superstars’. In particular, I find that popularity 
dominates all the other covariates at the top tail of  the earnings distribution and reaches its peak at the 
95th percentile of  this distribution. An increase in a player’s popularity is magnified by an earning premium 
of  approximately 35% at its maximum point, according to my estimates. Conversely, the role of  
bargaining power reaches its peak around the 75th percentile, generating an earnings premium of  
approximately 14%, but it is not statistically associated with the earnings of  players above this threshold. 
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The effect of  performances is, instead, more constant and becomes relatively less important after the 75th 
percentile. 
Overall, my findings suggest that the interpretations of  extraordinary earnings based only on very 
talented workers who “win and take all” seems insufficient in order to wholly capture mechanisms behind 
top earners and that other mechanisms need to be taken into account. my findings, for instance, suggest 
that bargaining power plays a non-negligible role, and in the case of  players, an agent’s market power is 
important in order to negotiate better deals with team owners. The importance of  this factor has also 
been found for other high earners, i.e., CEOs, and this encourages further research on the mechanism 
linking power and earnings and for other categories of  the super-rich. my findings also suggest that 
popularity – above all – allows individuals to become super-rich, especially in a context – such as football 
– characterised by the large spread of  pay-TV technology and the internet. This allows teams to be 
watched by a global audience and contributes to redistributing the largest share of  revenues towards the 
most popular players. With a few possible differences across sectors, this can be a factor explaining the 
earnings of  other high earners, such as actors, musicians, and of  virtually all workers in sectors 
characterised by a large audience.  
Future lines of  research might benefit from the approach followed in this article jointly analysing the role 
of  performance, popularity and power in the earnings of  workers in sectors different from professional 
team sports. Moreover, a focus on the role of  these determinants along the entire distribution of  earnings 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Sample characteristics 
Variable Description Mean (St. dev.) 
Dependent variable   
Wage Net earnings (pre-season values) in thousands/€ 875.1 (911.7) 
Log wage Log of  net earnings (pre-season values) 6.38 (0.87) 
Individual controls   
Age Age (years) 26.6 (4.2) 
Age square Age squared 725.8 (226.7) 
Position Dummies for defenders (40.2%), midfielder (39.9%) and forward (19.9%) 
Captain Dummy for the team’s captain 0.034 (0.181) 
Minutes played Minutes played during the season 1352.8 (1068.3) 
Total international caps Number of  caps with the national team up to 2014-2015 15.75 (25.10) 
Total Under-21 caps Number of  caps with the U21 national team up to 2014-2015 5.85 (8.68) 
International caps Number of  caps with the national team during the season 2.01 (4.65) 
Under-21 caps Number of  caps with the U21 national team during the season 0.37 (1.59) 
Player’s performance   
Grade Mean grade by newspapers during the season 5.77 (0.41) 
Goal Goal scored during the season 1.93 (3.50) 
Assist Assist served during the season 1.28 (2.04) 
Measure of  popularity   
Popularity Google researches results (million) 4.21 (9.37) 
Measures of  power   
Agent Market value  Market value of  players represented by the same agent (in 
millions/€) 
101.6 (214.4) 
Number of  players Number of  players represented by the same agent 47.4 (104.7) 
Mean market value Mean market value of  players represented by the same agent 
(in millions/€) 
1.83 (2.23) 





Table 2. Distributions of annual net wages: percentiles, percentile ratios and Gini coefficient 
 2013-2014 All seasons 
Mean 787.2 875.1 
Standard Deviation 877.2 911.7 
Minimum 30 30 
P10 200 200 
P25 300 300 
P50 500 550 
P75 900 1000 
P90 1700 2000 
P95 2500 3000 
Maximum 6500 6500 
P95/P90 1.5 1.5 
P95/P75 2.8 3.0 
P95/P50 5.0 5.5 
P95/P25 8.3 10.0 
P95/P10 12.5 15.0 
Gini coefficient 0.490 0.474 
a Expressed in thousands of Euros 
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Table 3. Distribution of team’s characteristics in 2013-2014a 







Mean 92,815 -8,263 54,808 10,494 
S.D. 72,778 24,918 37,895 10,629 
Minimum 34,348 -79,882 25,164 1,516 
p10 42,318 -36,740 29,552 1,956 
p25 44,724 -14,040 29,870 3,903 
p50 56,215 -2,796 33,937 4,187 
p75 116,446 1,441 66,014 15,134 
p90 246,679 14,261 119,547 28,698 
Maximum 272,404 44,124 163,478 38,051 
a Only teams who also participated in the Serie A during the 2012-2013 season are considered 
 
Table 4. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and power.  
OLS estimates 
 Baseline  Nonperformance-related measures of popularity 
and powera 








grade 0.0630*** 0.0308** 0.0792*** 0.0392*** 
 0.0207 0.0148 0.0206 0.0148 
goal 0.1144*** 0.0637*** 0.1231*** 0.0690*** 
 0.0224 0.0161 0.0224 0.0161 
assist 0.0339* 0.0184 0.0519*** 0.0286** 
 0.0185 0.0131 0.0185 0.0131 
popularity 0.1599*** 0.1000***   
 0.0198 0.0143   
power 0.0812*** 0.0214*   
 0.0170 0.0124   
popularitya    0.1338*** 0.0837*** 
   0.0166 0.0120 
powera    0.0770*** 0.0203* 
   0.0161 0.0117 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 
aIreplace among regressors popularity and power measures with the residuals of OLS estimates on popularity and power, 
respectively, ran including among regressors goal, assist, grade, age, age squared and season dummies. b The following 
control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies on citizenship (Italian, EU, 
extra EU); dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played minutes; number of national 
team caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season and until 
2014-2015 season; season fixed effects. c Team fixed effects are added to the control variables of the baseline model. 









Table 5. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and power.  
Random effects estimates 
 Baseline  Nonperformance-related measures of popularity 
and powera 




No team fixed 
effectsb 
Team fixed  
effectsc 
grade 0.0307** 0.0237* 0.0410*** 0.0309** 
 0.0145 0.0128 0.0146 0.0128 
goal 0.0772*** 0.0594*** 0.0811*** 0.0632*** 
 0.0181 0.0156 0.0181 0.0156 
assist 0.0116 0.0105 0.0214 0.0184 
 0.0141 0.0122 0.0141 0.0122 
popularity 0.0684*** 0.0692***   
 0.0153 0.0132   
power 0.0947*** 0.0393**   
 0.0257 0.0176   
popularitya   0.0573*** 0.0579*** 
   0.0128 0.0111 
powera   0.0898*** 0.0372** 
   0.0244 0.0167 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 
aIreplace among regressors popularity and power measures with the residuals of OLS estimates on popularity and power, 
respectively, ran including among regressors goal, assist, grade, age, age squared and season dummies. b The following 
control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies on citizenship (Italian, EU, 
extra EU); dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played minutes; number of national 
team caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season and until 
2014-2015 season; season fixed effects. c Team fixed effects are added to the control variables of the baseline model. 
Standard Errors in italics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 6. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance and popularity.  
Fixed effects estimates 
 Baseline  Nonperformance-related measures of popularitya 
 No team 
fixed effectsb 
Team fixed effectsc No team fixed effectsb Team  
fixed effectsc 
grade 0.0192 0.0127 0.0216 0.0151 
 0.0149 0.0134 0.0149 0.0134 
goal 0.0481** 0.0351** 0.0498*** 0.0369** 
 0.0190 0.0170 0.0191 0.0171 
assist -0.0020 -0.0074 0.0011 -0.0043 
 0.0145 0.0129 0.0145 0.0129 
popularity 0.0323** 0.0334**   
 0.0160 0.0142   
popularitya   0.0271** 0.0280** 
   0.0134 0.0119 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 
aIreplace among regressors popularity measure with the residuals of OLS estimates on popularity ran including among 
regressors goal, assist, grade, age, age squared and season dummies. b The following control variables are included (all 
referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; 
number of played minutes; number of national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during 
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the season; season fixed effects. c Team fixed effects are added to the control variables of the baseline model. Standard 




Table 7. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and power. UQRab 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95 
grade 0.0352 0.0631** 0.1073*** 0.1220*** 0.1175*** 0.0979* 
 0.0297 0.0277 0.0302 0.0451 0.0445 0.0511 
goal -0.0021 0.0120 0.1466*** 0.3346*** 0.2170** 0.2100** 
 0.0178 0.0202 0.0323 0.0555 0.0865 0.0994 
assist -0.0203 0.0249 0.0684** 0.1245*** 0.1086** 0.0975 
 0.0151 0.0178 0.0286 0.0477 0.0530 0.0711 
popularitya 0.0255** 0.0374** 0.0923*** 0.2189*** 0.2788*** 0.3540*** 
 0.0107 0.0169 0.0252 0.0489 0.0546 0.0875 
powera 0.0312** 0.0507*** 0.1283*** 0.1380*** -0.0539 0.0024 
 0.0154 0.0160 0.0209 0.0470 0.0498 0.0618 
Team Fixed Effects No No No No No No 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 
aIreplace among regressors popularity and power measures with the residuals of OLS estimates on popularity and power, 
respectively, ran including among regressors goal, assist, grade, age, age squared and season dummies. b The following 
control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies on citizenship (Italian, EU, 
extra EU); dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played minutes; number of national 
team caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season and until 
2014-2015 season; season fixed effects. Standard Errors in italics. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Table 8. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and power. UQRab 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95 
grade 0.0215 0.0410* 0.0598** 0.0282 0.0625 0.0605 
 0.0276 0.0240 0.0269 0.0410 0.0432 0.0520 
goal -0.0123 -0.0199 0.0807*** 0.2185*** 0.1567** 0.1651* 
 0.0182 0.0199 0.0283 0.0471 0.0742 0.0917 
assist -0.0334** 0.0045 0.0336 0.0803** 0.0955* 0.1010 
 0.0154 0.0168 0.0249 0.0406 0.0509 0.0708 
popularitya 0.0137 0.0093 0.0409** 0.1054*** 0.2070*** 0.3189*** 
 0.0106 0.0131 0.0196 0.0344 0.0485 0.0875 
powera 0.0131 0.0155 0.0463*** 0.0259 -0.0957** -0.0436 
 0.0129 0.0135 0.0176 0.0389 0.0483 0.0600 
Team Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 
aIreplace among regressors popularity and power measures with the residuals of OLS estimates on popularity and power, 
respectively, ran including among regressors goal, assist, grade, age, age squared and season dummies. b The following 
control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies on citizenship (Italian, EU, 
extra EU); dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played minutes; number of national 
team caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season and until 






Figure 1. Kernel density estimate of  annual net wages in 2013-2014 
 
 
Figure 2. Total net wage bill paid to players by teams participating to the 2013-2014 seasona 
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Figure 3. Estimated coefficients of the association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and 
power along the earnings distributiona. UQR- No team fixed effects model 
 

















Figure 4. Estimated coefficients of the association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and 
power along the earnings distributiona. UQR- Team fixed effects model 
 




































grade 0.0647*** 0.0312** 0.0588*** 0.0299** 0.0639*** 0.0318** 
 0.0206 0.0148 0.0205 0.0148 0.0205 0.0148 
goal 0.1133*** 0.0635*** 0.1143*** 0.0640*** 0.1133*** 0.0630*** 
 0.0224 0.0161 0.0222 0.0160 0.0222 0.0160 
assist 0.0346* 0.0186 0.0319* 0.018 0.0355* 0.0192 
 0.0184 0.0131 0.0183 0.0130 0.0183 0.0130 
popularity 0.1545*** 0.0990*** 0.1424*** 0.0950*** 0.1504*** 0.0967*** 
 0.0198 0.0144 0.0197 0.0144 0.0197 0.0143 
Measures of Agent’s bargaining power 
market value 0.1443*** 0.0352*   0.0619*** 0.0132 
 0.0279 0.0203   0.0173 0.0126 
number of players -0.0008*** -0.0002     
 0.0003 0.0002     
mean market value   0.0502*** 0.0152***   
   0.0072 0.0054   
wage standard dev.     0.0002*** 0.0001*** 
          0.0000 0.0000 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 
a The following control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies for the 
position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played minutes; number of national team caps during the season; 
number of national under-21 team caps during the season; season fixed effects. b Team fixed effects are added to the control 





Table A2. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and alternative measures of 
power. 














grade 0.0308** 0.0238* 0.0290** 0.0226* 0.0304** 0.0239* 
 0.0145 0.0128 0.0144 0.0127 0.0145 0.0128 
goal 0.0767*** 0.0593*** 0.0760*** 0.0590*** 0.0772*** 0.0593*** 
 0.0181 0.0156 0.0180 0.0155 0.0180 0.0156 
assist 0.0112 0.0103 0.0106 0.0101 0.0120 0.0107 
 0.0141 0.0122 0.0140 0.0122 0.0141 0.0122 
popularity 0.0661*** 0.0678*** 0.0607*** 0.0636*** 0.0661*** 0.0672*** 
 0.0153 0.0132 0.0152 0.0132 0.0153 0.0132 
Measures of Agent’s bargaining power 
market value 0.1778*** 0.0734**   0.0690*** 0.0260 
 0.0413 0.0287   0.0267 0.0184 
number of players -0.0011** -0.0004     
 0.0004 0.0003     
mean market value   0.0718*** 0.0326***   
   0.0113 0.0080   
wage standard dev.     0.0002*** 0.0001** 
      0.0001 0.0000 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 
a The following control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies for the 
position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played minutes; number of national team caps during the season; 
number of national under-21 team caps during the season; season fixed effects. b Team fixed effects are added to the control 





Table A3. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and power.  
RIF regressions.a 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95 
grade 0.0312 0.0568** 0.0916*** 0.0949** 0.0968** 0.0673 
 0.0298 0.0278 0.0304 0.0452 0.0443 0.0505 
goal -0.0039 0.0094 0.1403*** 0.3203*** 0.1997** 0.1878* 
 0.0178 0.0201 0.0322 0.0554 0.0865 0.0995 
assist -0.0243 0.0188 0.0534* 0.0947** 0.0789 0.0573 
 0.0152 0.0178 0.0285 0.0479 0.0536 0.0703 
popularity 0.0304** 0.0447** 0.1102*** 0.2615*** 0.3331*** 0.4229*** 
 0.0128 0.0202 0.0301 0.0585 0.0652 0.1045 
power 0.0329** 0.0535*** 0.1353*** 0.1456*** -0.0568 0.0025 
 0.0163 0.0169 0.0220 0.0496 0.0525 0.0651 
Team F.E. No No No No No No 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 
a The following control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies on 
citizenship (Italian, EU, extra EU); dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played 
minutes; number of national team caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; number of national under-21 team 




Table A4. Association between annual net (log) wages, performance, popularity and power.  
RIF regressions.a 
 Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Q95 
grade 0.0195 0.0393 0.0535** 0.0176 0.0504 0.0357 
 0.0276 0.0241 0.0269 0.0409 0.0430 0.0516 
goal -0.0132 -0.0205 0.0780*** 0.2118*** 0.1442* 0.1453 
 0.0182 0.0198 0.0282 0.0470 0.0741 0.0919 
assist -0.0354** 0.0029 0.0273 0.0674* 0.0755 0.0664 
 0.0153 0.0168 0.0250 0.0406 0.0513 0.0698 
popularity 0.0164 0.0111 0.0489** 0.1259*** 0.2473*** 0.3810*** 
 0.0127 0.0157 0.0234 0.0411 0.0579 0.1046 
power 0.0138 0.0164 0.0488*** 0.0273 -0.1010** -0.0460 
 0.0136 0.0142 0.0185 0.0410 0.0509 0.0633 
Team F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 1198 
a The following control variables are included (all referred to the previous season): age and age squared; dummies on 
citizenship (Italian, EU, extra EU); dummies for the position on the pitch; dummy for team captain; number of played 
minutes; number of national team caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; number of national under-21 team 
caps during the season and until 2014-2015 season; season fixed effects; team fixed effects. Standard Errors in italics. *** 














Health shocks and labour market outcomes: 





This study uses traumatic injuries as a source of exogenous variation in professional football players' 
health combined with an IV strategy to provide estimates of the causal impact of a health shock on labour 
market outcomes. Using a unique longitudinal dataset on the universe of professional players in the Italian 
Serie A, I find that 30-days injury increases the probability of renegotiating the contract by about 10% 
and reduce net wages by around 12%. Compared to other results, my own demonstrate that health shocks 
can have a large impact on the earnings of super-rich especially among those largely relying on physical 
skills. This effect is largely driven by employer’s concern about depreciation in the worker’s human capital 










An extract from this chapter is published as: Carrieri, V., Jones, A. M., & Principe, F. (2018). Health 
shocks and labour market outcomes: evidence from professional football (No. 18/01). HEDG, c/o 




Health shocks are a major concern for the labour market. In fact, health shocks affect peoples’ lives 
across a number of different dimensions including productivity, labour market participation, labour 
income and healthcare costs, resulting in reduced household disposable income. The direct effect of 
health shocks on income and education is also the basis of the health selection hypothesis that is one of 
the leading explanations - along with the direct effect of income on health - of the socio-economic 
gradient in health observed in most countries (Deaton, 2003). The labour market consequences of 
health shocks have been the object of a large literature intersecting both health and labour economics 
with evidence from both developed and developing countries (see Section 2 for a literature review). 
However, due to the scarcity of relevant data, most of the contributions have focused on elderly 
workers and have analysed labour market participation as their main outcome.  
Furthermore, to the best of my knowledge, there are no studies that analyse the effects of the health 
shocks on the top tail of the labour income distribution, the so-called “working super-rich”. This 
segment of the distribution has been the subject of keen economic interest for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, since the 1970s, top income shares started to rise substantially in all developed countries, in 
particular, the English-speaking ones (Atkinson et al., 2011). Secondly, the share of top incomes is 
considered a reliable indicator of long run inequality across the entire distribution.  In fact, the income 
concentration at the top of the distribution is highly correlated with relative poverty and other 
inequality measures (Leigh, 2007). The analysis of income concentration at the top is then useful to 
understand also the evolution of the bottom of the income distribution. Lastly, following the recent 
contribution of Alvaredo et al. (2013), a substantial change in the composition of income shares at 
the top of the distribution has been found. In fact, in all the countries for which data are available, 
there has been a shift from capital income to labour income as the main component of the top 1% 
income shares. For instance, in Italy, earnings accounted for the 46.4% of the total in 1980 while they 
accounted for 70.9% of the total in 2008 and, similarly, among the 0.1% richest segment of the 
population, the share of earnings rose from 29.5% to 66.2% in the same period (Franzini et al. 2016). 
Thus, the labour market seems to be fertile ground for the escalation of contemporary society’s 
extreme inequalities and, understanding how the “working super-rich” respond to health shocks can 
be a key element of these dynamics.  
This chapter aims to fill this gap by providing evidence of the relationship between health shocks and 
labour market outcomes of individuals in the top tail of earnings distribution. In particular, the aim 
of this research is to analyse traumatic injuries as exogenous variation in professional football17 
                                                             
17 Throughout this paper, I use the word “football” to indicate European football. In the US, this is known as “soccer”. 
40 
 
players’ health to provide estimates of the causal impact of a health shock on two main labour market 
outcomes: the annual net wages and the probability of renegotiating the contract between the 
employer (the club) and the employee (the player). To this end, I have created a unique longitudinal 
dataset recording data about wages, performances, popularity and injuries of the universe of football 
players of the Italian Serie A followed from 2009 to 201418. This dataset was built by merging 
information from several reliable sources of data.  
The choice of focusing on data from professional football is based on a number of considerations. 
Firstly, the football market is based on short-term contracts (generally 3-4 years), generating high 
volumes on renegotiation and players being traded in every market window; this allows for 
observations based on a large variation in wages across seasons. Secondly, the football players 
constitute a large share of the top earners. In fact, in 2003, among the top 500 earners, representing 
the top 0.01% of the distribution, about 20% were football players or managers in Italy (Franzini et 
al. 2016).  Lastly, as argued by Kahn (2000): “professional sports offers a unique opportunity for 
research. There is no research setting other than sports where I know the name, face, and life history 
of every production worker and supervisor in the industry”. In fact, professional sports data allow a 
perfect match between employer (the club) and employee (the player) and to have measures to proxy 
individual productivity and estimate team production functions. In recent years, the use of sports 
data to address health-related issues has been rising. Recent contributions include Stoecker et al. 
(2016), who examine the impact of influenza transmission on mortality by looking at local sports 
team success through the participation in Super Bowl of the National Football League (NFL)19, and 
Hanson et al. (2017), who exploit a difference-in-differences framework in order to examine the 
effects of the “Crown of the Helmet Rule” on players’ injuries in the NFL20. 
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature. Firstly, as previously discussed, it 
focuses on the consequences of health shocks for those on top incomes, for whom there is scant 
evidence so far. Secondly, it provides causal evidence of the relationship between health shocks and 
labour market outcomes. This is a rather difficult task given the possible endogeneity of health shocks 
in relation to labour supply, which may result from both simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity 
(Lindeboom and Kerkhofs 2009; Cai, 2010).  In this study, I exploit the exogenous (traumatic) nature 
of the health shock in which player may incur, the longitudinal nature of my dataset which allows us 
                                                             
18 Italian Serie A is one of  the five most followed football leagues in the world, alongside the Premier League (England), Bundesliga 
(Germany), La Liga (Spain) and Ligue 1 (France). Yearly, it has a turnover of  about 1.9 billion Euros. Among the “big five” leagues, 
Italian Serie A is the one with the highest incidence of  the wage bill on the clubs’ costs, absorbing about 70% of the clubs’ total earnings 
(Deloitte, 2017). 
19 American football league. 
20 Implemented in 2013 by NFL, it aims at reducing incidence of  concussions and head injuries by penalizing a player who intentionally 
initiates contact with another player using the top of  his helmet.  
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to sweep out individual time invariant characteristics and an instrumental variable strategy (using the 
average number of yellow cards received by the team as an instrument) to reduce any further 
endogeneity concerns. Lastly, my data allows for a deeper analysis of the main mechanisms of the 
health shock, disentangling the effect mediated through the player’s performance and the one 
generated by human capital depreciation, inducing the club to offer a lower wage for precautionary 
reasons.  
We find that health shocks affect significantly the labour market outcomes of super-rich but in a very 
particular way if compared to “ordinary” workers. First, in terms of magnitude, I find that a 30-day 
injury results in a reduction of the following year’s wage by about 12%. This effect is significantly 
higher than the one found for other workers. Interestingly, I also find that this reduction can be 
explained more in terms of precautionary measures being taken by the club rather than through any 
direct effect that the injury might have had on productivity. Consistently, the injury is found to be 
positively associated with the probability of renegotiating the contract at the end of the season with 
the same club or by moving to another club. This is particularly true for more severe injuries.  Finally, 
I find that the main factors addressed by the literature about the determinants of super-earnings, such 
as performance and popularity, have a significant impact on the players’ wages. These results are 
robust to a number of model specifications and to alternative measures of health shocks and may be 
generalizable to other categories of super-rich whose earnings reflect competitive performance and 
popularity with the public.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides some insight about the 
literature on health shocks’ consequences on employees’ outcomes and the theoretical and empirical 
evidence about working super-rich’s wages determination. Section 3 describes the data gathering 
process, explaining the main variables and providing some descriptive statistics. Section 4 discusses 
the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the results and the final section summarises and 
concludes the study.  
 
2. Health shocks and top incomes   
 
This chapter is grounded in two main strands of the literature. Firstly, the literature about the impact 
of health shocks on labour market outcomes. Secondly, the theoretical and empirical literature about 
the determinants of top incomes, in particular the working super-rich, defined as individuals who 
receive high earnings due to their employment.  
42 
 
The relationship between health shocks and labour market outcomes is well established in the 
economic literature, with empirical evidence provided for both developed countries (e.g., García-
Gómez and López-Nicolás, 2006) and for developing countries (e.g., Wagstaff 2007, Wagstaff and 
Lindelow 2014, Mitra et al. 2016). However, as anticipated in the introduction, most of the 
contributions focus on labour participation as the main outcome (e.g., Jones et al. 2010, Cai et al. 2014 
) and use data based on elderly workers (e.g., Bound et al. 1999; Disney et al. 2006; Lee and Kim, 2008; 
Trevisan and Zantomio, 2016). The main findings show that health shocks have a negative impact 
on several dimensions, including consumption and income. For example, García-Gómez and López-
Nicolás (2006), using Spanish data from the European Community Household Panel, find that a 
transitory health shock has a negative impact on workers’ labour income that ranges between 1400 
and 1700 Euros, according to the length of the incapacity period. Halla and Zweimüller (2013) find 
that Austrian workers who experienced health shocks while commuting incur persistent income 
losses of about 2-3%, depending on the attachment to labour market. García-Gómez et al. (2013), 
using Dutch hospital and tax register data, find that an acute hospital admission lowers the 
employment probability by 7% and results in a 5% loss of personal income two years after the shock. 
A second strand of literature is mainly based on the “superstars” theories offered in the seminal 
contributions of Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985), as the basis for disentangling the determinants of 
super-earnings. In fact, they both argue that superstars arise in markets characterised by imperfect 
substitution on the demand side and joint consumption on the supply side, which generate a demand 
concentration towards the better performers (i.e., sportsmen, singers, artists, etc.), who “win and take 
all”. However, while for Rosen (1981) marginal differences in talent are magnified into huge earnings 
for the most talented due to the convexity of the revenue function, Adler (1985) argues that popularity 
is the main determinant of superstars’ earnings.  
From an empirical point of view, a number of researchers have made use of sports data to test these 
theories. For example, Lucifora and Simmons (2003) investigate “superstar” effects in the wage 
determination among football players in the Italian Serie A. They find earnings to be highly convex 
in measures of performance, after controlling for a set of personal characteristics and team fixed 
effects. Carrieri et al. (2017) finds that talent, popularity and agent’s bargaining power are all jointly 
significantly associated to higher wages of Italian football players but their impact is very 
heterogeneous along the distribution of earnings. Franck and Nuesch (2012), using data from the 
German Bundesliga, find that both talent and popularity significantly contribute to increasing the 
market value of superstars. Other studies (e.g., Mullin and Dunn 2002, Treme and Allen 2009, Treme 
and Allen 2011) focus on American professional sports, finding a positive effect of both measures of 
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performance and media exposure on the entry earnings of baseball (MLB) and basketball (NBA) 
players. 
Building on these strands of literature, this study aims at reconciling the evidence cited above and 
investigating the impact of a health shock on the labour market outcomes for a specific category of 
working super-rich: the professional football players of the Italian Serie A. 
 
3. Data and variables 
We created an original dataset recording information about wages, performance, injuries and other 
individual characteristics of the professional players of the Italian Premier League (Serie A), using 
several data sources. As a starting sample, I analysed data relating to 469 players who have had at 
least one appearance in the 2013-2014 football season - excluding goalkeepers, following the standard 
approach of this kind of literature (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003), since their performance is measured 
differently and they have a dissimilar exposure to the risk of injury compared to the outfield players. 
The careers of the players were then followed over a 5-season period, from 2010-2011 to 2014-2015. 
This provides a longitudinal dataset of 1,585 observations. The panel is unbalanced. In fact, the 
relegation/promotion system between Serie A and Serie B and the transfer market across national 
and international clubs generates a relatively large turnover of players in the league21.  
Data on players’ yearly wage - recorded net of taxes and excluding any performance-related bonus – 
are taken from the annual report, published at the beginning of each football season by the most 
influential Italian sport newspaper, La Gazzetta dello Sport. Importantly, focusing only on the fixed 
part of the wage allows for better understanding the effect of the shock on the stock of human capital 
and reduces concerns about reverse causality, since the dependent variable does not include bonuses 
that depend on performance. Moreover, to assess the impact of the injury on the renegotiation of the 
contract, I built a dichotomous variable with value 1 if the contract has been renegotiated at the end 
of the season with the same club or a new one, in case the player has been traded during the transfer 
market window, or value 0 in case of no renegotiation.  
Information about individual player’s characteristics (i.e., birth year, position on the pitch and 
international appearances) and performance (such as, goals and assists) are extracted from the website 
transfermarkt.com22. In addition, in order not to underestimate the performance of midfielders and 
                                                             
21 There are 20 teams taking part in Serie A. At the end of  the season, the last three are in the table are relegated to the second division 
(Serie B) and replaced by the first three of  Serie B.  
22 A German website recording information about football statistics, results, fixtures and news. Data from transfermarkt.com have been 
used in previous economic studies (i.e., Bryson et al., 2013). 
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defenders, I collected data about each player’s overall performance. These were recorded as the  
average of the three most read Italian sport newspapers, La Gazzetta dello Sport, Il Corriere dello Sport 
and Tuttosport, which rate the player’s performance after every match, with a scale that ranges from 0 
(poor performance) to 10 (excellent performance). In fact, most of the marks assigned by the 
journalists range between 4 and 8.  
With respect to injuries, I collected data about any injury that occurred in the seasons analysed. In 
particular, all the injuries were categorised according to the terminology and classification of Mueller-
Wohlfahrt et al. (2012). Alongside the type of injury, I collected information about the impact of the 
injury proxied through the days off, identified as the period of time in which the player has not been 
available for participating in the sports activity of the club (training and matches), and the number of 
official championship matches missed by the injured player. These data are taken from 
footballmarkt.com. Furthermore, since in the same season a player could incur more than one injury, to 
build the variable of interest, I consider the number of days off due to either muscular or traumatic 
injury and I include a dummy variable to control for the re-occurrence of the same injury during the 
season.  
Concerning the clubs, I analysed the annual balance sheets as approved by the directors of the 27 
clubs, matched with the players who took part in Serie A for the seasons considered. In particular, 
information was recorded about five balance sheet items: total wage expense, net sales, earnings 
before taxes (EBT) and revenues from ticketing and revenues from television rights.  
Other variables include a proxy of popularity, measured through the pre-season number of Google 
search results obtained each year for each player23 and several other characteristics, related to both 
clubs and player, which are used as controls in the estimates. These are presented, along with some 
summary statistics for all the variables, in the next section.  
3.1 Descriptive statistics  
All the variables included in my dataset, along with their mean values and standard deviations, are 
presented in Table 1. According to data used in this research, the average annual net wage of a player, 
in Italian Serie A, amounts to about 840,000 Euros, but with a very large standard deviation (891,000 
Euros). Figure 1 shows the non-parametric estimate of the wage distribution for the reference 
football season 2013-2014. The distribution is positively skewed with a long upper tail. This supports 
the idea of a restricted number of players who earns huge wages compared to the rest of the 
distribution and it is consistent with the theories of “superstars” emerging (Rosen 1980, Adler 1985). 
                                                             
23 Data refers to the same day for each player. They have been collected browsing “name-surname-team” in order to reduce any bias due to 
homonymy with respect to some surnames, which have higher incidence in Italy.  
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Indeed, the Gini index within the sampled football players group is 0.47, showing a large degree of 
inequality even within this group of “privileged” individuals24.  
Concerning the length of the contract, evidence suggests that contracts in the Italian Serie A usually 
last for 5 years, with the exception of young and old players, that are often characterized by shorter-
term arrangements (Carmichael et al. 2012). Contracts can be renegotiated even before the expiry date 
(often to contrast claims by other teams) and in some cases automatic earnings increases are 
established by the contract according, e.g., to the number of games played during a season. my data 
show that approximately 65% of players renegotiate the contract each year (56% renegotiate within 
the same team). This reinforces the focus on a particular type of job market in which the contracts 
quickly reflect the changes in terms of both productivity (performance) and health shocks.  
Concerning injuries, 50.5% of players included in the sample had at least one injury, of which 41.7% 
were muscle related, while the remaining 58.3% were caused by some kind of traumatic event, such 
as fractures, cruciate ligament rupture, etc. The re-occurrence rate is 10.4%. In the reference season 
2013-2014, on average, a player spent 21 days off activity and missed about 4 official matches. 
Moreover, information about the exact date of the injury was also collected. Figure A.1 (in the 
Appendix) shows the percentage distribution of the injuries alongside the different months of the 
year. Interestingly, the highest percentage of injury was recorded in September (about 15%), which 
is the first month of official matches after the summer break, followed by the winter months, 
probably due to worse weather conditions and player fitness. This heterogeneity is controlled for 
through the inclusion of month fixed effects in some model specifications. 
In this chapter, I focus in particular on traumatic injuries since they can be interpreted as an 
exogenous health shock. This assumes that the probability of such an exogenous shock is not 
correlated with any observed or unobserved characteristics that are related to the outcomes. Figure 2 
shows the non-parametric wage distribution comparing the group of those having at least one 
traumatic injury during the season and the control group of those who did not. The two distributions 
are highly similar, showing a long upper tail and an asymmetric distribution, a characteristic already 
observed above, when analysing the whole sample. However, as reported in Table 2 along with the 
                                                             
24  Estimates of  the Gini index are in line with results found for other soccer leagues. For instance, Franck and Nuesch (2006) 
find a Gini of  0.56 for the German Bundesliga in the 2004-2005 season (but referring to market values that include also 
bonuses and potential transfer fees and are then likely to be more dispersed than wages), while Send (2016) finds a Gini 
of  0.51 considering the earnings of  the German Bundesliga players in the 2014-2015 season. A higher inequality emerges 
instead in the US Major Soccer League: Reilly and Witt (2007) find a Gini of  0.628 in 2007 (0.569 excluding from the 




relevant percentiles of wage distribution, a large dispersion emerges but the distribution is fairly 
similar within both groups. In fact, the within-groups inequality is slightly larger among the injured 
players, with the Gini indices of 0.45 and 0.43, respectively.  
Furthermore, to ensure that the two groups do not systematically differ due to pre-injury observable 
characteristics and to investigate possible concerns of selection bias, I report descriptive statistics for 
the relevant covariates in Table 3. Remarkably, the mean ages of the two groups do not show a large 
difference, being 27.9 and 27.3, respectively. The injured players on average earned 95,000 euro more 
than the controls and played 200 minutes less. However, even if the average wage gap between the 
two groups seems to be large in absolute terms, it is important to notice that since the study analyses 
a sample of individuals with very high earnings, the relative size of the gap is less concerning. Indeed, 
a Student’s t-test of the means suggests that these differences are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level, reinforcing the idea that such a shock may be regarded as random.  
Finally, Table A.1 reports the clubs’ characteristics regarding some relevant balance sheet items. The 
clubs have great differences in wage bills with the richest clubs paying almost 7 times more than the 
bottom ones. Indeed, this inequality is also reflected in the television rights distribution, which is 
fairly skewed among the clubs.  Substantial heterogeneity emerges among Serie A clubs suggesting 
the need for controlling for team fixed effects in the estimates.  
 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
We aim to obtain causal estimates related to the impact of a health shock on three dimensions: wages, 
probability of renegotiating the contract and productivity. Firstly, a fixed effects model is used to 
assess the impact of an injury on the player’s wage while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
and an IV strategy is used to handle potential endogeneity concerns and random measurement errors. 
Secondly, a fixed effects logit model is used to assess the probability of contract renegotiation 
following the injury.  
4.1 Fixed-effects model 
We make use of the fixed effects model as principal specification. In fact, after performing the 
Hausman test, it strongly rejects the hypothesis that the random effects model provides consistent 
estimates (Woolridge, 2002). The main strength of the FE model is that it takes into account time-
invariant observed and unobserved individual characteristics. Controlling for time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity eliminates the effect of some individual peculiarities, such as their attitude 
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to training and genetic or physical characteristics, which might have an effect on both the health 
shock and the outcome.  
Thus, the model to be estimated is the following Mincerian wage equation: 
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑾)𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝑺𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝑺𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕       (1) 
where, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the annual player’s wage in season t, net of taxes 
and bonuses. The coefficient of interest is γ, where the covariate 𝑺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 represents the incidence of 
the health shock through the number of days off due to the reported injury.  𝑿𝒊𝒕−𝟏 represents a set 
of individual time-varying characteristics that are used as controls. All the variables are time lagged 
to reduce potential reverse causality concerns. Specifically, I include the following controls: age, the 
square of age, a number of experience related characteristics (e.g., the number of international 
appearances with either the senior national team or the under 21, a dummy for the team’s captain), 
the total number of minutes played in the previous season. Moreover, I include dummies for the 
player’s position on the pitch (defenders, midfielders and forwards), dummies to distinguish the 
players nationality (Italian, EU and extra EU) and season dummies. 𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏 is a set of covariates which 
includes proxies of talent and popularity to take into account the main explanations of superstars’ 
earnings (Rosen 1980, Adler 1985). These are goals scored, assists served, ratings given by the 
newspapers and the number of Google search queries. 𝒖𝒊𝒕 is the composite error term, including 
both the individual specific and the idiosyncratic error terms.  
4.2 Instrumental variable strategy 
While the fixed effects model controls for time invariant individual characteristics, unobserved 
idiosyncratic factors affecting both the health shock and the outcome of interest might be still an 
issue. Thus, to address concerns about the endogeneity of the health shock and possible measurement 
errors, I exploit a fixed-effects instrumental variables strategy (FE-IV).  
The first stage equation is defined as follows: 
𝑺𝒊𝒕−𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝒛𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝑺𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕                  (2) 
where the instrument z is assumed to satisfy cov(S,z)≠0 and cov(u, z)=0 so that it is correlated with 
the endogenous variable S and uncorrelated with the error term u. In the FE-IV estimator, the fitted 
values of 𝑺 ̂derived from equation (2) are plugged into the original regression equation: 




As an instrument I make use of average value of the yellow cards received by the team j, excluding 
those of the player i. This excludes the individual’s own effort and creates a more pure peer effect, 
which is correlated with the individual “aggressiveness” put in the game but not with his own wage.  
Yellow cards have the advantage of measuring the severity of the fouls and should be exogenous 
being assigned by an external figure, the referee. Indeed, I also might have used information about 
the yellow cards received by the opponent teams. Yet, the fact that the model takes the football 
season as the unit of time, implies that in one season every team faced the others twice, thus using 
the opponent’s yellow cards as an instrument would not show enough dispersion.  
There are a number of conditions to hold for the instrument to be reliable. Firstly, the instrument 
has to show some variation over time. This is guaranteed by the fact that, as argued above, the trading 
of players generates a large turnover of players among teams. The same is also true for the managers. 
Thus, every season, the players play alongside different teammates and face a different team attitude, 
according to their team’s aims and manager’s strategy.  
Secondly, the instrument has to be correlated with the potential endogenous variable “days off due 
to injury”. In the framework, yellow cards can be used as a measure of the “aggressiveness” of the 
team. Thus, it is correlated to the probability of being injured through two different channels. On 
one hand, a more aggressive team might incur a higher risk due to their attitude towards the game.  
On the other hand, due to a mechanism of reciprocity, the opponent team might play in a tougher 
way in response, increasing the number of foul plays and, consequently, the probability of injuries. 
Lastly, the instrument, conditional on the health shock, should not affect the individual wage. With 
respect to this, I make use of the average yellow cards of the player’s i teammates, which may affect 
his game style through a “peer effect”, but it is unlikely to have any correlation with his own wage. 
4.3 Binary choice models 
One main advantage of using sports data for labour market analysis is the availability of information 
about the contract between the player and the team, which can be renegotiated at any point before it 
expires. There are two main reasons for renegotiating the player’s contract. First, if the contract is 
close to expiry, the club might not want to risk losing a player without any monetary compensation. 
Second, the player may be traded to another club during one of the two transfer market periods, thus 
entailing the signing of a new contract. To assess the impact of the health shock on the probability 




Firstly, a linear probability model (LPM) is used to exploit the longitudinal nature of the data and the 
IV strategy, with fixed effects to control for individual time-invariant characteristics. I estimate the 
following equation: 
𝒅𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑿𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑷𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜸𝑺𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝑺𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒐𝒏𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕         (4) 
where dit is a dichotomous variable assuming either value 1, if the contract between the player and 
the club has been renegotiated at the end of the season, or value 0 if it had not. The covariate Sit-1 
represents the incidence of the health shock through the number of days off due to the reported 
injury. The remaining set of covariates is the same as described in the equation (1). I use standard 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors and t-statistics to deal with heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, 
to reduce any concern about the endogeneity of the health shock, I implement the IV strategy as 
explained above, using the 2SLS estimator and instrumenting the injury through the average value of 
the team’s yellow cards, excluding those of the individual i. 
Secondly, I use a fixed-effect logit model. The FE logit allows for both the individual time invariant 
characteristics and the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable. Compared to the LPM, the 
FE logit gives a response probability that ranges from 0 to 1. However, one drawback of the FE logit 
models is that the interpretation of the results is somewhat cumbersome, due to the problem of 
computing predicted probabilities of the outcome and the marginal or discrete effects when the fixed 
effect is unknown. To overcome this issue, it is common practice in the empirical literature to 
interpret the effect in terms of odds ratio or on the conditional probability (Cameron and Trivedi, 
2010). Indeed, both these methods are less intuitive when it comes to the economic interpretation. 
In this chapter, I interpret the FE logit model coefficients in terms of odds ratios.  
5. Results 
5.1 Strength of the instrument 
Before presenting the main results, I assess the validity of the IV approach. Table A.2 in the Appendix 
presents the first-stage regressions on the full set of covariates, for the different specifications. The 
instrument is strongly correlated with the health shock measure. Thus, results indicate that playing 
for a more aggressive team is associated with a higher number of days off, significant at 1% level, 
confirming the intuition behind the relevance of the instrument. 
Furthermore, at the bottom of the Table A.2, I report the F-test results of whether the excluded 
instrument significantly differs from zero. The F-statistic is always above 10, which is generally 
adopted as “rule of the thumb” for the minimum threshold to reject the null hypothesis of a weak 
instrument (Staiger and Stock, 1997). In addition, Stock and Yogo (2005) provided a more formal 
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threshold (16.38) to test the weakness of the instrument. My instrument’s F-test is also above this 
critical value, ranging between 18.34 and 20.45 across the different specifications.  
5.2 Effects of health shock on wages 
Tables 4-6 show the results of the fixed effects model described in Equation (1), with the logarithm 
of wage as the dependent variable. Table 4 shows the results for the full sample, Table 5 controls for 
muscular injuries and Table 6 shows results for a subsample in which muscular injuries are dropped. 
Column 1 of each table reports the results of the FE model, without team and month fixed effects. 
Column 2-3 include results with either team or month fixed effects, Column 4’s results account for 
both. Moreover, to make the economic interpretation of the coefficient of interest easier and 
comparable, I account for 30 days variation in the number of days off due to injury. Other covariate 
coefficients are presented according to a change of one standard deviation, as reported in the 
summary statistics (Table 1). Since the dependent variable is in log format, the estimated coefficients 
report a percentage variation in the net annual wage associated with a one standard deviation increase 
of the independent variable.  
Table 4 shows a negative relationship between days off due to injury and the net wage. In particular, 
one-month of injury is associated with a reduction of about 2.5% in the wage of the following season. 
The size and significance of the coefficient remains the same when controlling for team fixed effects 
and it slightly increases where month fixed effects are controlled for.  
With respect to the other covariates, Table 4 shows that both indicators of performance and 
popularity are significant and have a positive effect on the annual net wage. In particular, in the 
baseline model (Column 1), a one-S.D. increase in goals and popularity affects the following season’s 
wage by about 4.9% and 3.2%, respectively. Coefficients remain almost unaltered when accounting 
for team and month fixed effects. 
These results are robust to different model specifications, when controlling for muscular injuries 
(Table 5) or dropping them from the sample (Table 6). Indeed, in Table 5, the coefficient of days off 
due to muscular injuries is not statistically significant. This result supports the intuition that the health 
shock effect on wages is due to those injuries which have an underlying random component, such as 
the traumatic injury types. 
Interestingly, it is possible to observe a larger spread between coefficients when month fixed effect 
are included. These results indicate that, during the wage bargaining process, variation across the 
season should be accounted for. In particular, some months might be associated with worse weather 
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conditions or with a larger number of matches played due to the calendar of fixtures, which exposes 
players to higher stress in some periods of the season. 
The results for the FE-IV estimation on the full set of controls are shown in Table 7. Making use of 
the teammates’ yellow cards as an instrument, results in a significant increase in the coefficient of the 
days off variable. A one-month injury has a more negative effect on the wage, reducing it by about 
12%; the coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. 
With respect to the other covariates, a one-S.D. increase in goals and popularity leads to a positive 
effect on the annual net wage of about 5.4% and 3.4%, respectively. The effect is slightly higher than 
in the FE model and the coefficients concerning goals are still significant at the 5% level while the 
for popularity they drop to the 10% level, showing less spread among the different model 
specifications, when team and/or month fixed effect are controlled for. 
Moreover, results show a non-linear relationship between age and the wage. In particular, wage 
increases with age due to the cumulated experience and knowledge of the game until a turning point 
in which these time varying personal characteristics are overcome by the progressive loss of physical 
skills. I estimated this turning point to be at around 32 years old, higher than in the early-2000 
evidence (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003) and consistent with the evidence of the elongation of players’ 
careers observed in the last 15 years.  
Table 8 reports estimates that exclude the performance-related covariates. This further specification 
disentangles the effect of the injury on the wage between being a direct effect and an indirect one, 
which is mediated by the performance. It is interesting to notice that when the model does not control 
for performance, the coefficient of the days off increases by around 1%, across the different 
specifications. Thus, it is possible to argue that the effect of the injury is mediated through 
performance, due to reduced physical skills, by only a small amount. Indeed, these results can be seen 
in a framework of human capital depreciation as showing that during the bargaining process the club 
is willing to offer a lower amount to the player for precautionary reasons rather than because it is 
concerned by the negative effect of the injury on the individual’s productivity. 
 5.3 Effects of health shocks on renegotiation  
Tables 9 and 10 show the results of the binary choice models of wage renegotiation with and without 
controlling for performance, respectively. Table 10 thus includes in the sample also those individuals 
whose performance was not measurable due to the fact that they did not play any official match, 
because of season-long injuries. Columns 1-4 of both tables report estimates of the linear probability 
model described in Equation (4) while columns 5-8 report results of the fixed-effect logit model. 
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Table 9 shows that health shocks are positively associated with the probability of renegotiating the 
contract at the end of the season. The coefficient is anyway not statistically significant at conventional 
levels. However, when including in the sample also long-season injured, as in Table 10, injury effect 
turns to be negative and statistically significant. Specifically, a 30-day injury is found to increase the 
probability of renegotiating the contract by approximately 9.8%. Results show similar patterns when 
considering the FE logit model, in terms of odds ratio.  
Thus, from these results an interesting dynamic emerges. Injury is found to have a significant effect 
on the probability of renegotiation of the contract.  This effect is even more prominent if the injury 
resulted in worse performances or persisted throughout the entire season, preventing the player from 
taking part in any official match. It follows that a player, either due to the reduced performance or 
because he fails to demonstrate a degree of reliability measured in terms of the number of games 
played, is found to accept a less-paid contract by the same club or to be compelled to migrate to 
another club at the end of the season and thus to renegotiate his contract.  
Concerning the other covariates, every additional 90 minutes played increase the probability of 
renegotiating the contract by about 0.85 points. Essentially, the clubs are interested in extending the 
contracts of those players who guarantee a higher reliability in terms of both physical and tactical 
integrity and experience, cumulated through the larger number of matches played. 
Interestingly, a 1 S.D. increase in popularity is negatively associated with the contract renegotiation. 
This result is indicative of a well-known dynamic in the football market. In fact, when a player’s 
popularity increases they have an increased incentive to delay the contract’s renegotiation with their 
own club with the aim of arriving as close as possible to the expiration date in order to threaten the 
club into offering them a higher wage so as not to lose the player without any monetary 
compensation, at the end of the contract. Furthermore, a more popular player represents for the club 
an important asset in terms of merchandising and image rights. Hence, the bargaining process 
becomes much more complex and the timing plays a central role.  
6. Robustness checks 
 
To check the robustness of these findings, I perform a number of sensitivity analyses. Firstly, an 
alternative measure of health shock, namely the total number of official league matches in which the 
player was reported as “not available due to injury” is used to check whether the results are confirmed. 
In fact, it may be argued that the maximum number of days off is specific to the form of injury and 
not influential in given periods of the year if it does not overlap with any official match. Nevertheless, 
the channel through which the club decides to offer a lower wage might be based on the actual rate 
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of participation of the player in official matches. The estimates, reported in Table 11, show that the 
results are robust based on this alternative health shock measure. In fact, every additional match 
missed negatively affects the wage for the following season by approximately 2.8%. This result is 
consistent for both magnitude and sign with the main results. In fact, in one month, on average, a 
club has scheduled about 5 Serie A matches, making this result proportional to the baseline one, in 
which 30-day variations in the number of days off were considered. Furthermore, this alternative 
model confirms the strength of the instrument, whose F-test ranges between 16.56 and 19.08, across 
the different specifications, as reported in the first stage F-test at the bottom of Table 11.  
Secondly, I test whether the dynamics of the model are correctly specified. In fact, under multi-year 
contracts, the effect on the wage might have been determined by a health shock which occurred in a 
previous season compared to the one of the baseline model (i.e., t-2 or t-3). Thus, I run the model 
including the lagged values of days off, up to three seasons before. Table 12 shows that even though 
the number of days off in earlier seasons is negatively associated with the net wage, the coefficients 
are not statistically significant at conventional levels, reinforcing the idea that the negative effect is 
caused by the injury occurred just in the previous season with respect to the eventual contract 
renegotiation. 
Thirdly, to check the robustness of the hypothesis about the existence of a difference between the 
direct effect of the health shock on the outcome and the indirect one, mediated through performance, 
I estimate performance measures that are not affected by injury. In particular, I proxy the non-injury 
affected performance by the OLS residuals of the regression of the performance’s measures (i.e., 
grade, goal and assist) on the number of days off, while controlling for age and seasonal fixed effects. 
Then, I include the injury-purged variables as covariates in the FE-IV estimation. The results, 
reported in Table 13, show that the magnitude and the sign of the health shock index remains 
unaltered compared to the baseline model. Interestingly, in this specification, the grade of the overall 
performance becomes statistically significant: a 1 S.D. increase in the injury-purged performance 
positively affects the net wage of the following year by approximately 4.7%. This strengthens the 
evidence in support of the existence of both a direct and indirect effect of the health shock. 
Furthermore, the first stage regressions reported in Table 13 show a slight improvement of the power 








This chapter exploits data from professional football to estimate the effect of health shock on labour 
market outcomes. Using a unique longitudinal dataset created by recording information about several 
characteristics of the universe of football players of the Italian Serie A followed from 2009 to 2014, 
my analysis makes a number of substantial contributions to the extensive literature on the labour 
market consequences of health shocks.  
Firstly, I report evidence on the effect of the shock on the outcomes of a significant share of the 
working super rich. Working super rich phenomenon started to rise considerably from 1970’s in all 
developed countries attracting the interest of many scholars (Atkinson et al., 2011). Previous analyses 
focused on several dimensions of this phenomenon, including the determinants of the high earnings 
and the effects on overall inequality. However, to the best of my knowledge, no previous studies 
focused on the effect of a health shock on their earnings. Health might be instead a key dimension 
to better understand the dynamics of contemporary society’s extreme inequalities. Secondly, I exploit 
the exogenous nature of the traumatic injuries and the availability of panel data to retrieve causal 
estimates of the effect of the health shock on labour market outcomes. Moreover, I employ an 
instrumental variable strategy which use the average number of yellow cards received by the team as 
an instrument to reduce any further endogeneity concerns. This is a rare feature of studies analysing 
the relationship between health shocks and outcomes on cross-sectional survey data. In these settings, 
it is generally hard to deal with the endogenous relationship between health shocks and labour market 
outcomes. Lastly, professional sports data provides detailed measures of worker’s productivity. This 
is useful in order to disentangle the main channels through which health shock affects labour market 
outcomes in my setting.  
The main findings of this chapter can be summarised as follows. Firstly, I find that health shocks 
have a strong negative effect on the wages of the professional football players of the Italian Serie A. 
In particular, having a 30-day injury reduces the wage of the following year by approximately 12%. 
Secondly, I find that only a residual part of the negative effect could be explained through the reduced 
performance of the players after the injury. In fact, results suggest that the largest part of the 
coefficient is explained by a direct effect of the shock on the outcome. This result can be explained 
in a framework of human capital depreciation. The club has an incentive to offer a lower wage for 
precautionary reasons, supposing that players who experienced a severe injury might incur similar 
injuries in the future. Thus, the club insures itself against this risk by reducing the fixed share of the 
wage, which is independent by performances.  
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Furthermore, I find that the effect of the injury on the probability of renegotiating the contract, at 
the end of the season, increases with its severity. In fact, different model specifications show that 
having a season-long injury increase the probability of renegotiating the contract with the same club 
or another one by about 10%. This result suggests that the effect is explained by both the detrimental 
effect of the injury on performance and the precluded participation of the player in official matches.  
Finally, in line with the theoretical and empirical literature about super-earnings, If ind that 
performance and popularity play an important role in explaining the wages of the “working super-
rich”.   
Overall, these findings suggest that also working super-rich are negatively affected by health shocks 
in terms of reduced earnings but with interesting peculiarities with respect to the “ordinary workers”. 
First, the magnitude of the impact of a health shock on working super-rich’s income seems to be 
significantly larger than the effect on other workers. For instance, Halla and Zweimüller (2013) find 
an income loss of about 2-3% among workers incurring in accidents when commuting in Austria, 
while García-Gómez et al. (2013) report a 5% loss of personal income following acute hospital 
admission in the Netherlands. I find instead a wage penalization of 12% for an “only” 30-days injury.  
Thus, the exposure to the health shock seems to have more dramatic economic consequences for 
super-rich workers and the high salaries they receive are likely to incorporate also a premium against 
the high costs associated to the health shocks. The average short length of the contract represents an 
additional element of uncertainty in the career of these workers and may contribute to further 
exacerbate the negative consequences of the health shocks. Secondly, the precautionary reasons 
underlying the wage penalization represents a substantial difference with respect to the effect of 
health shocks in other parts of the income distribution. This might be partly due to the activity of the 
football player largely based on physical skills that might raise employee’s concerns around his future 
productivity. My results are then likely to apply also other categories of super-rich whose rewards 
reflect competitive performance and popularity with the public. On the other hand, the large effect 
of health shock on these categories might be also due to the characteristics of the markets in which 
these workers are generally involved. These are characterised by frequent contract renegotiations and 
high job turnover. 
Further research might investigate whether the patterns observed in my setting apply also other 
categories of super-rich workers involved in less-physically demanding jobs, such as the CEOs. 
Similarly, an analysis on data from other professional sports or other football leagues might be useful 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Sample characteristics  
Variable Description Mean (St. dev.) 
Dependent variable 
Wage Net earnings (pre-season values) 
in thousands/€ 
875.1 (911.7) 
Log wage Log of net earnings (pre-season 
values) 
6.38 (0.87) 





Age Age (years) 26.6 (4.2) 
Age square Age squared 725.8 (226.7) 
Position Dummies for defenders (40.2%), midfielder (39.9%) and forward 
(19.9%) 
Captain Dummy for the team’s captain 0.034 (0.181) 
Minutes played Minutes played during the season 1352.8 (1068.3) 
Total international caps Number of caps with the national 
team up to 2014-2015 
15.75 (25.10) 
Total Under-21 caps Number of caps with the U21 
national team up to 2014-2015 
5.85 (8.68) 
International caps Number of caps with the national 
team during the season 
2.01 (4.65) 
Under-21 caps Number of caps with the U21 
national team during the season 
0.37 (1.59) 
Player’s performance 
Grade Mean grade by newspapers during 
the season 
5.77 (0.41) 
Goal Goals scored during the season 1.93 (3.50) 
Assist Assists served during the season 1.28 (2.04) 
 
Index of popularity 
Popularity Google search results (million) 4.21 (9.37) 
 
Index of health shock 
Injury Dummies for the kind of injury 
 
 
Days-off traumatic Number of days off due to 
traumatic injury 
11.08 (38.77)  
Days-off muscular Number of days off due to 
muscular injury 
4.77 (12.90) 
Re-occurrence Dummy for the re-occurrence of 
the same kind of injury 
4.79 (7.35) 
Matches off Total number of matches missed 
due to any injury 
4.04 (7.12) 
Instrumental variable Player/Team  







Table 2. Wage distribution: percentiles and Gini Index 
 Total Treatment Control 
Mean 985.9 1050.9 955.8 
Standard Deviation 941.3 1025.1 898.9 
Minimum 30 30 30 
p10 300 300 300 
p25 400 400 400 
p50 650 700 600 
p75 1200 1200 1100 
p90 2100 2400 2100 
p99 4500 4900 4200 
Maximum 6500 5500 6500 
Gini Index 0.474 0.453 0.435 
 
Table 3. Within group characteristics 




 Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Min Max Mean Standard 
Dev. 
Min Max   
           
Wage 1050.9 1025.1 30 5500 955.7 898.9 30 6500 95.2 0.11 
Caps 22.49 8.95 1 38 24.5 9.51 0 38 2.01 0.005 
Minutes 1651.9 814.0 8 3230 1811.6 904.9 0 3643 159.6 0.004 
Age 27.9 4.1 19 40 27.3 3.8 18 39 0.6 0.01 
Goal 2.56 4.14 0 28 2.52 3.68 0 29 0.04 0.84 
Assist 1.72 2.29 0 12 1.67 2.15 0 14 0.05 0.72 
Grade 5.76 0.43 3.33 6.75 5.78 0.39 3.67 6.7 0.02 0.33 
Popularity 0.45 0.89 0.003 9.20 0.39 0.87 0.002 9.66 0.06 0.28 
1 p-value for the Student t-test of means comparison. H0 diff=0; Ha diff≠0 
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Table 4. Effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage. Fixed effects estimates.  
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 












 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.8971*** 0.9031*** 0.8796*** 0.8856*** 
 0.0639 0.0640 0.0640 0.0641 
     
Age sq. -0.0150*** -0.0151*** -0.0148*** -0.0149*** 
 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
     
Goal 0.0491*** 0.0486** 0.0507*** 0.0502*** 
 0.0190 0.0190 0.0189 0.0189 
     
Assist -0.0024 -0.0031 -0.0045 -0.0053 
 0.0144 0.0144 0.0144 0.0144 
     
Grade 0.0181 0.0188 0.0176 0.0184 
 0.0149 0.0149 0.0148 0.0148 
     
Popularity 0.0321** 0.0330** 0.0315** 0.0325** 
 0.0160 0.0160 0.0159 0.0159 
     
Days-Off traum. -0.0250** -0.0250** -0.0283** -0.0284** 
 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 0.0118 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1197 1197 1197 1197 
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Table 5. Effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage. Fixed effects estimates. 
Days off due to muscular injury as control. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.8924*** 0.8984*** 0.8786*** 0.8847*** 
 0.0642 0.0643 0.0642 0.0643 
     
Age sq. -0.0149*** -0.0150*** -0.0148*** -0.0149*** 
 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 0.0011 
     
Goal 0.0487** 0.0482** 0.0505*** 0.0501*** 
 0.0190 0.0190 0.0189 0.0189 
     
Assist -0.0029 -0.0036 -0.0046 -0.0054 
 0.0145 0.0145 0.0144 0.0144 
     
Grade 0.0175 0.0183 0.0175 0.0182 
 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 0.0149 
     
Pop 0.0321** 0.0331** 0.0315** 0.0325** 
 0.0160 0.0160 0.0159 0.0159 
     
Days-Off traum. -0.0230* -0.0230* -0.0276** -0.0277** 
 0.0120 0.0120 0.0121 0.0121 
     
Days-Off musc. 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 0.0002 
 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1197 1197 1197 1197 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 












Table 6. Effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage. Fixed effects estimates. 
Days off due to muscular injury dropped. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.8051*** 0.8059*** 0.8000*** 0.8015*** 
 0.0761 0.0765 0.0760 0.0764 
     
Age sq. -0.0134*** -0.0134*** -0.0134*** -0.0134*** 
 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 
     
Goal 0.0586** 0.0586** 0.0572** 0.0571** 
 0.0248 0.0249 0.0248 0.0248 
     
Assist 0.0097 0.0096 0.0070 0.0068 
 0.0189 0.0190 0.0189 0.0190 
     
Grade 0.0397** 0.0398** 0.0401** 0.0403** 
 0.0191 0.0192 0.0191 0.0191 
     
Popularity 0.0329 0.0331 0.0321 0.0324 
 0.0204 0.0205 0.0204 0.0205 
     
Days-off traum. -0.0217* -0.0218* -0.0281** -0.0283** 
 0.0132 0.0132 0.0136 0.0137 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 848 848 848 848 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 














Table 7. Effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage.                          
Fixed effects-IV estimates.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Days-off -0.1211** -0.1204** -0.1258** -0.1250** 
 0.0563 0.0558 0.0598 0.0592 
     
Age 0.9795*** 0.9861*** 0.9776*** 0.9839*** 
 0.0856 0.0857 0.0859 0.0859 
     
Age sq. -0.0161*** -0.0161*** -0.0160*** -0.0161*** 
 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 0.0014 
     
Goal 0.0538** 0.0540** 0.0533** 0.0535** 
 0.0214 0.0214 0.0216 0.0216 
     
Assist 0.0043 0.0038 0.0033 0.0027 
 0.0167 0.0167 0.0169 0.0168 
     
Grade 0.0276 0.0286* 0.0282 0.0293* 
 0.0169 0.0169 0.0172 0.0172 
     
Popularity 0.0345* 0.0353* 0.0351* 0.0359* 
 0.0183 0.0183 0.0185 0.0185 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1099 1099 1099 1099 
First Stage F-test 20.23 20.45 18.34 18.62 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 













Table 8. Effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage.                              
Fixed effects-IV results. Performance not controlled for.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Days-off -0.1303** -0.1309** -0.1362** -0.1367** 
 0.0581 0.0578 0.0620 0.0615 
     
Age 1.0168*** 1.0246*** 1.0141*** 1.0217*** 
 0.0882 0.0884 0.0885 0.0887 
     
Age sq. -0.0167*** -0.0168*** -0.0167*** -0.0168*** 
 0.0014 0.0014 0.0015 0.0015 
     
Popularity 0.0334* 0.0343* 0.0341* 0.0350* 
 0.0186 0.0186 0.0188 0.0188 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1099 1099 1099 1099 
First Stage F-test 19.67 19.80 17.74 17.97 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 

















Table 9. Effects of health shock and other covariates on renegotiation.                                             
Binary choice models estimates. 
  Linear probability model  Fixed effects logit   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Days-off 0.079 0.079 0.054 0.057 1.082 1.083 1.056 1.059 
 0.073 0.073 0.075 0.075 1.08 1.09 0.72 0.76 
         
Age 0.052 0.046 0.042 0.036 1.053 1.047 1.043 1.036 
 0.111 0.103 0.099 0.100 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.36 
         
Age sq. 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 1.002 1.002 1.002 1.002 
 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.86) 0.97 1.01 1.05 
         
Caps 0.008* 0.009* 0.008* 0.008* 1.008* 1.009* 1.008* 1.008* 
 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 1.80 1.76 1.71 1.76 
         
Goal -0.037 -0.037 -0.039 -0.039 0.963 0.963 0.961 0.961 
 0.028 0.027 0.026 0.026 -1.34 -1.41 -1.53 -1.52 
         
Assist 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 1.002 1.002 0.997 0.997 
 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.09 0.10 -0.15 -0.13 
         
Grade 0.020 0.020 0.024 0.023 1.021 1.020 1.024 1.023 
 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.93 0.93 1.13 1.09 
         
Pop. -0.040* -0.041* -0.037* -0.038* 0.960* 0.960* 0.963* 0.963* 
 0.024 0.021 0.020 0.020 -1.70 -1.94 -1.85 -1.87 
Team FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
N 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 1099 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 












Table 10. Effects of health shock and other covariates on renegotiation.                                          
Binary choice models estimates. Performance not controlled for. 
  Linear probability model     Fixed effects logit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Days-off 0.098** 0.104** 0.069 0.075 1.103* 1.109* 1.072 1.079 
 0.046 0.047 0.049 0.050 2.13 2.25 1.40 1.50 
         
Age 0.200** 0.189** 0.189** 0.179** 1.221* 1.208* 1.209* 1.196* 
 0.083 0.079 0.074 0.076 2.42 2.38 2.55 2.36 
         
Age sq. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.91 -0.84 -0.93 -0.80 
         
Caps 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.010*** 
 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 5.97 6.15 5.91 5.95 
         
Pop. -0.031* -0.032** -0.028** -0.029** 0.969* 0.969* 0.972* 0.972* 
 0.017 0.014 0.014 0.014 -1.86 -2.18 -2.01 -2.05 
TeamFE No Yes No Yes No Yes No No 
Month Fe No No Yes Yes No No Yes No 
N 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 1527 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 
















Table 11. Robustness check: effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage. 
Alternative health shock’s measure. Fixed effects-IV estimates.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Matches-off -0.0282** -0.0294** -0.0289** -0.0301** 
 0.0134 0.0141 0.0140 0.0147 
     
Age 1.0003*** 1.0117*** 0.9996*** 1.0109*** 
 0.0930 0.0956 0.0933 0.0960 
     
Age sq. -0.0162*** -0.0164*** -0.0162*** -0.0163*** 
 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 0.0015 
     
Goal 0.0472** 0.0467** 0.0467** 0.0462** 
 0.0220 0.0223 0.0222 0.0225 
     
Assist 0.0098 0.0096 0.0093 0.0090 
 0.0177 0.0179 0.0177 0.0179 
     
Grade 0.0355* 0.0369** 0.0361* 0.0376** 
 0.0184 0.0187 0.0187 0.0190 
     
Popularity 0.0313* 0.0322* 0.0316* 0.0326* 
 0.0187 0.0189 0.0188 0.0190 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1099 1099 1099 1099 
First Stage F-test 19.08 17.59 17.72 16.56 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 













Table 12. Robustness check: effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage. 
Lagged health shock’s values included. Fixed effects estimates. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 0.9356*** 0.9371*** 0.9253*** 0.9280*** 
 0.1319 0.1313 0.1335 0.1325 
     
Age sq. -0.0155*** -0.0155*** -0.0153*** -0.0154*** 
 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 
     
Goal 0.0451* 0.0453* 0.0449* 0.0454* 
 0.0256 0.0256 0.0251 0.0251 
     
Assist 0.0266 0.0265 0.0252 0.0250 
 0.0172 0.0170 0.0171 0.0170 
     
Grade 0.0446** 0.0446** 0.0449** 0.0449** 
 0.0206 0.0206 0.0204 0.0204 
     
Popularity 0.0583* 0.0584* 0.0565* 0.0567* 
 0.0336 0.0336 0.0330 0.0331 
     
Days-off -0.0333* -0.0331* -0.0348* -0.0346* 
 0.0186 0.0185 0.0187 0.0186 
     
Days-offt-2 -0.0220 -0.0220 -0.0201 -0.0201 
 0.0215 0.0215 0.0215 0.0213 
     
Days-offt-3 -0.0365 -0.0364 -0.0351 -0.0349 
 0.0242 0.0242 0.0241 0.0241 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 664 664 664 664 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps in the league during the season; 
number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team caps during the season; dummy 











Table 13. Robustness check: Effects of health shock and other covariates on annual net (log)wage. 
Injury-purged variables included. Fixed effects estimates.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Days-off -0.1218** -0.1207** -0.1258** -0.1246** 
 0.0544 0.0536 0.0574 0.0564 
     
Age 0.9777*** 0.9841*** 0.9755*** 0.9817*** 
 0.0818 0.0817 0.0819 0.0817 
     
Age sq. -0.0159*** -0.0160*** -0.0159*** -0.0160*** 
 0.0013 0.0013 0.0014 0.0014 
     
Goal_purged 0.1150*** 0.1150*** 0.1149*** 0.1148*** 
 0.0324 0.0322 0.0326 0.0323 
     
Assist_purged 0.0826*** 0.0820*** 0.0821*** 0.0815*** 
 0.0297 0.0295 0.0297 0.0295 
     
Grade_purged 0.0467** 0.0476** 0.0478** 0.0486** 
 0.0202 0.0201 0.0208 0.0206 
     
Popularity 0.0337* 0.0346* 0.0342* 0.0351* 
 0.0180 0.0179 0.0181 0.0181 
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1099 1099 1099 1099 
First Stage F-test 21.46 21.98 19.77 20.34 
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively  
a Covariates concerning  purged Goal, Assist and Grade refers to OLS residuals of  the covariate regression on days off, age, 
age sq. and season fixed effects.    b  The model includes the full set of controls: dummy for the team captain; number of caps 
in the league during the season; number of senior national team caps during the season; number of national under-21 team 













Figure 1. Kernel density estimate of annual net wages 
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Net Sales EBT Ticketing Television 
Mean 19,656 90,720 -8,630 10,838 53,341 
Standard Deviation 13,519 68,682 29,247 10,511 35,240 
min 6,9 22,450 -93,767 1,516 7,610 
p10 7,85 36,880 -45,919 2,213 25,164 
p25 9,1 42,834 -14,040 3880 29,870 
p50 13 56,312 -1,745 5,014 34,499 
p75 28 116,446 3,636 15,134 70,744 
p90 42,95 212,419 12,438 31,017 115,010 
p99 47,6 272,404 84,582 38,051 163,478 
max 47,6 272,404 84,582 38,051 163,478 
































Table A.2 First stage regressions. 
 
 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Days-off Days-off Days-off Days-off 
 
Age 0.7763*** 0.7770*** 0.7214** 0.7220** 
 0.2963 0.2997 0.2947 0.2981 
     
Age sq. -0.0100** -0.0100* -0.0093* -0.0093* 
 0.0051 0.0051 0.0050 0.0051 
     
Under 21 -0.0252 -0.0272 -0.0256 -0.0278 
 0.0472 0.0477 0.0467 0.0472 
     
International 0.0096 0.0098 0.0100 0.0101 
 0.0157 0.0159 0.0154 0.0156 
     
Captain -0.1979 -0.1936 -0.2266 -0.2223 
 0.3099 0.3096 0.3149 0.3145 
     
Caps -0.0610*** -0.0613*** -0.0587*** -0.0590*** 
 0.0083 0.0084 0.0087 0.0087 
     
Goal 0.0113 0.0129 0.0063 0.0079 
 0.0851 0.0851 0.0848 0.0849 
     
Assist 0.0385 0.0389 0.0269 0.0271 
 0.0629 0.0632 0.0637 0.0640 
     
Grade 0.0749 0.0760 0.0774 0.0787 
 0.0793 0.0795 0.0786 0.0788 
     
Popularity 0.0356 0.0355 0.0400 0.0398 
 0.0690 0.0693 0.0690 0.0694 
     
Reoccurrence 0.2779 0.2741 0.2859 0.2819 
 0.2080 0.2088 0.2111 0.2119 
     
Yellow cards 0.5388*** 0.5510*** 0.5140*** 0.5266*** 
 0.1595 0.1585 0.1572 0.1563 
     
Team FE No Yes No Yes 
Month FE No No Yes Yes 
N 1099 1099 1099 1099 






WHO and for how long? An empirical 







We explore the effects of the 2015 World Health Organization’s warning- about the carcinogenic effect 
of red meat consumption- on households’ behaviour. A striking novelty of my analysis is the examination 
of both short and long term effects of a health warning and their variations across households differing 
with respect to average educational level and household health awareness. To identify these effects, I use 
data collected on a monthly basis that allow to compare variations in a very narrow window across the 
delivery of the warning and I exploit the strong seasonality patterns in red meat consumption in Italy, 
mainly associated with culinary traditions in occasion of catholic holidays celebrations. I combine both 
features in a difference-in-differences framework and I document a general misinterpretation of the 
warning and a short-term fall in red meat consumption by around 5%. The warning caused a long-lasting 
and consistent shift in red meat consumption only among households with higher educational levels and 
health awareness. These findings highlight a brand-new driver of health-education gradient and have 






An extract from this chapter is published as: Carrieri, V., & Principe, F. (2018). WHO and for how long? 
An empirical analysis of the consumers’ response to red meat warning (No. 18/08). HEDG, c/o 





The increasing incidence of illnesses, of which unhealthy diet is one of the key risk factors, represents 
one of the main health challenges nowadays. According to the WHO (2014), non-communicable diseases 
related to a poor diet caused 68% of the deaths globally in 2012. Indeed, the poor eating behaviour of 
the individuals is associated with a vast array of health issues such as obesity, diabetes and cancer, resulting 
in detrimental effects on individual well-being and leading to poor economic outcomes (Cawley 2015).  
In response to this sort of epidemic, the public authorities have increased the volume of information 
provided about the consequences of unhealthy diet. As documented by the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations (FAO), there have been increased efforts by international 
organisations, governments, civil society and the private sector to promote healthy diets in the last twenty 
years, in both developed and developing countries (Hawkes 2013). The main actions have included media 
campaigns, nutritional labelling and food safety warnings. However, as with other kinds of information 
policy, it is quite evident that these initiatives are welfare-improving insofar as they produce a persistent 
shift in behaviours which is able to generate significant and long-lasting improvements in individual 
outcomes. As Weiss and Tschirhart (1994) correctly point out, “looking at the effectiveness of public 
information campaigns directs attention toward the capacity of campaigns to capture the attention of the 
right audience, to present a clear message, to influence the beliefs or understanding of the audience, and 
to create the contexts for desired social outcomes”. Moreover, insofar as promoting equity is also a twin 
objective of information activities, it is also important that these activities should be designed in a way of 
granting accessibility and interpretation also for less-educated groups (Shapiro, 2005). 
This study, for the first time in the literature, addresses all these aspects together by investigating the 
consequences on consumers’ behaviour resulting from one important health warning released by the 
International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) of the WHO in October 2015. This was based on 
a relevant publication appeared on an issue of The Lancet Oncology reporting evidence about carcinogenicity 
of the consumption of red meat and processed meat. In particular, the WHO warning classified some 
kind of red meat as Group 2A, i.e. probably carcinogenic to humans, and processed red meat as Group 1, 
i.e. carcinogenic to humans. The warning is particularly significant as it concerns highly consumed foods 
which are included in many daily meals around the world. In fact, the news was rapidly circulated by 
national health authorities, magazines and mass media, and also the demand for information around the 
topic was rapidly increasing in the period following the warning. Both factors made “red meat” one of 
the trending topics on the web in October 2015 around the World, (see Section 2 for more details). 
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We investigate this issue in the geographical context of Italy using data from the Household Budget 
survey (HBS) which collects expenditures of a large and representative sample of Italian Households. 
Italy represents an interesting case study and an ideal setting to test these effects for a number of reasons. 
First, given the long-lasting attention towards food quality associated with the Mediterranean diet. This 
attention is witnessed, for instance, by a huge amount of related Google searches in the period following 
the warning; an amount significantly larger than the one observed in almost equally sized countries, such 
as the UK (see Section 2 for further details). Secondly, available data from Italy includes accurate 
information on all kinds of expenditure made by a family collected on a diary-form from the 2014 to 
2016. Diary based survey is usually taken to be the most reliable way to gather information expenditures 
and are considered to be of high quality (Browning et al. 2003; Browning and Leth-Petersen 2003). 
Importantly, my data are recorded on a monthly basis. This is a rare feature of expenditure data which 
are often available only on a quarterly basis. Monthly data allow us to compare households’ expenditure 
variation in a very narrow window across the delivery of the WHO warning and thus to rule out long-
term trends in consumption. Lastly, I can exploit a very nice feature of red meat consumption in Italy 
which is the presence of a strong seasonality in consumption mainly associated with culinary traditions 
in occasion of catholic holidays celebrations (see Section 2 for more details). 
We combine these features in a difference-in-differences framework to analyse both the short and the 
long-run effect of the WHO warning and their variations across different consumer subgroups, i.e. 
households differing with respect to average educational level and household health awareness (defined 
according to the consumption of healthy and unhealthy items, see Section 3). Indeed, when a new piece 
of health information becomes available, people might respond differently according to their diverse 
stock of information and ability of processing it as well as to their awareness about the health 
consequences of certain behaviours (Shapiro, 2005). Moreover, households may need some time to 
absorb the new pieces of information and to adapt their behaviour and this may lead to very different 
responses in the short versus long run.  
This analysis makes a number of contributions to different strands of literature. Firstly, there is a large 
volume of literature exploring the effects of health authorities’ announcements on the households’ 
consumption patterns. Seminal papers (Hamilton 1972; Warner 1989) mostly focused on the smoking 
hazard campaigns. More recent papers, directly relevant to my study, investigate the effect of food safety 
advisories on both health and economic outcomes. Smith et al. (1988) analyse the impact of media 
coverage of milk contamination in Hawaii and find that negative news had a greater impact than positive 
news on consumers’ behaviour. Rousu et al. (2007) use an experimental design to examine the impact of 
information about genetically modified food on consumers’ willingness to pay. Schlenker and Villas-Boas 
(2009) found that health warnings about mad cow disease significantly reduced beef sales. Other studies 
79 
 
(Oken et al. 2003; Shimshacka et al. 2007; Shimshacka and Wardb 2010) document strong evidence of the 
effects of the 2001 FDA advisory about mercury–related risks in fish consumption. However, the 
evidence about the effectiveness of public advisories to improve welfare is mixed. On one hand, evidence 
shows that consumers may under-respond or distrust the advisory (Burger and May, 1996). On the other 
hand, several studies (e.g. Viscusi 1997; Fox et al. 2002) document an alarmist over-reaction to negative 
information and that consumers tend to place greater weight on more pessimistic sources of risk 
information. While these studies advance current knowledge on the reactions of consumer to health 
warnings, they focus essentially on a short-run effect and do not analyse the heterogeneity in the 
consumer response. This chapter will show that these aspects are, instead, extremely relevant since the 
response of consumers is actually very heterogeneous across groups both with respect to the magnitude 
of the effect and to the persistence of the consumption shift.   
Secondly, my analysis is linked to the literature exploring the nexus between health policies and 
preventative behaviour. This literature generally suggests that, consistently with the predictions of rational 
economic actions (Viscusi et al. 1986), the provision of health risk information induces individuals to 
adopt precautionary behavioural changes. However, with few exceptions (Viscusi et al. 1986; Carrieri and 
Wuebker 2016; Capacci et al. 2018), this relies essentially on observational data. However, the 
identification of a clear causal link between health interventions and risk-taking decisions is difficult in a 
non-experimental setting, due to unobserved individual characteristics (i.e. risk aversion, inter-temporal 
preferences) which are likely to affect both the outcome and the individual effort to acquire new 
information. my quasi-experimental identification strategy allows us to overcome these identification 
issues and thus to retrieve a causal effect of public policies delivering health information on precautionary 
behaviours. 
Lastly, there is a large body of literature documenting the heterogeneous effects generated by new 
technology introduction or information availability as a main source of socio-economic status (SES) 
related health inequalities. In fact, as shown by Contoyannis and Forster (1999), responsiveness to these 
innovations may vary across socio-economic groups, i.e. a higher take-up rate among the richer or more 
educated, resulting in a dichotomy between efficiency and equity: average population health and 
inequalities in health may both increase. As suggested by Deaton (2002) and verified by several empirical 
papers (Cutler and Lleras-Muney 2006 for a survey, Goesling2007, Conti et al. 2010, Clark and Roayer 
2013, Lundborg 2013, Brunello et al. 2016), education seems to be the key element to disentangle the 
relationship between socioeconomic status, health outcomes and health innovation uptake. In line with 
this literature, this study confirms the beneficial effect of education on responsiveness to health warnings. 
However, it also finds that education along with the health awareness are the main drivers of a stable, 
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more accurate-and not just higher- consumption shift in response to the warning. This may contribute 
to a better understanding of the role of education and health awareness on SES-related inequalities. 
Our findings have relevant implications for the design of public policies delivering health information. 
In particular, my results suggest that such policies should be designed in a way that expose the individual 
to a constant flow of information and that particular attention should be paid on the informational 
message in order to avoid misinterpretation and low compliance especially among less-educated 
individuals. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The following section provides more insights into 
the WHO warning and its media resonance. Section 3 presents the data. In section 4, I discuss my 
identification strategy. Section 5 presents and discusses the results. Section 6 reports some robustness 
checks. The last section summarises and concludes.  
 
2. Institutional setting: the WHO warning 
 
In October 2015, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) of the WHO published an 
issue of The Lancet Oncology reporting evidence about carcinogenicity of the consumption of red meat and 
processed meat. In particular, red meat was classified as Group 2A, i.e. probably carcinogenic to humans, 
which refers to evidence from epidemiological studies about the association between meat consumption 
and developing colorectal cancer. On the other hand, processed meet was classified as Group 1, i.e. 
carcinogenic to humans, which refers to sufficient causal evidence linking red meat consumption and 
cancer in humans. Red meat refers to all mammalian muscle meat, including beef, veal, pork, lamb, 
mutton, horse, and goat. Processed meat includes meat that has been transformed through salting, curing, 
fermentation, smoking, or other processes to enhance flavour or improve preservation (e.g., hot dogs, 
ham, sausages, corned beef and canned meat). According to the IARC, eating 50 grams of processed 
meat per day increases the risk of colorectal cancer by about 18%, while red meat consumption is 
associated with an increased risk of developing colorectal, pancreatic, and prostate cancer. These 
estimates suggests that about 34,000 cancer deaths per year worldwide are attributable to diets high in 
processed meat (Global Burden of Disease Project 2016); a number that would increase by 50,000 if the 
relationship with Group 2A red meat was proven to be causal.  
Following the evaluation from IARC, the WHO gave health recommendations to prevent the risk of 
cancer associated with the consumption of meat, inviting individuals to moderate their consumption of 
meat, particularly processed meat, to reduce the risk of developing cancer. Since the publication of the 
WHO report in October 2015, the news of the WHO warning had a huge echo across the mass media 
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and was rapidly spread through social networks. To give an idea of this resonance, Figure 1 shows the 
Google trends for both the search engine hits (as a proxy of the demand of information) and the volume 
of news (the supply of information) related to red meat in Italy from 2004 to 2017.  
[Figure 1 around here] 
As can be seen, both lines representing the relative frequencies, reach their peak in correspondence of 
October 2015, which is by far the month with the highest volume since 2004 (the first year in which data 
are available). In Italy, the news had even more echo if compared to countries with a similar population 
size. For instance, according to the volume data provided by Google AdWords, the term “carne rossa”, 
in Italy, has been searched around 49500 times in October 2015, while its English corresponding “red 
meat” has been searched only 9600 times in the United Kingdom (a country with an even slightly larger 
population) in the same period. Interestingly, Figure 1 also shows the presence of other peaks for what 
concerns the news supply, starting approximately around the middle of 2011. This is attributable to the 
diffusion of the research outcomes of the first studies exploring the link between the consumption of 
red meat and some kind cancers, i.e. especially colorectal and prostate cancer (Punnen et al. 2011; Takachi 
et al. 2011).  However, if in the other cases there was only a consequent negligible increase in the number 
of search hits by the consumers, the 2015’s official warning by the WHO generated by far the highest 
frequency for both the supply and the consequent demand of information around the health effects of 
red meat consumption. 
 
3. Data and Variables 
 
Our data come from the Italian Household Budget Survey, which is a cross-sectional survey carried out 
once a year by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). In agreement with EUROSTAT, the 
survey is based on the harmonised international classification of expenditure voices (Classification of 
Individual Consumption by Purpose - COICOP) to ensure international comparability and it is included 
in the National Statistical Program, i.e. it is used to compute official indicators used by the governments 
for many purposes such as official relative and absolute poverty thresholds. The survey provides detailed 
information about the monthly expenditure of the household for goods and services destined for 
household consumption, alongside a number of demographic and socioeconomic information. Data are 
collected using a dual system, i.e. a diary followed by a face-to-face interview. In fact, every sampled 
household receives a diary every month where they are asked to record the daily expenditure sustained 
by all the household’s components, the consumption of goods produced by the household and the place 
of purchase of goods and services. This information is then validated during the interview in which all 
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other kind of information are also collected. Data are finally made public every year with expenditures 
listed on a monthly basis. As stressed in the introduction, this is a rare feature of household survey and 
it will be particularly useful to carefully identify my effects of interest. 
In this chapter, I use data from 2014 to 2016. my sample thus consists of about 17,000 observations per 
wave. Data before 2014 were collected in a different fashion and thus they are not directly comparable 
to the last two waves. However, information on main aggregates of expenditure are still comparable and 
I will use them for placebo regressions and to illustrate the validity of the common trend hypothesis (see 
Section 6 for more details)25.   
Our outcomes, following the IARC’s report, refer to the expenditures for the different kind of meats 
grouped according to their risk classification. Thus, the variable Group 2A includes expenditure for beef, 
pork, lamb and goat; Group 1 includes cured meat, sausages and canned meat and the variable Red Meat 
includes meats from both groups. Expenditures are expressed in Euros and VAT included. 
In the baseline specification, I include the total amount of food expenditure as a control variable. This is 
in line with the literature about household expenditure (Deaton, 1997) and it is useful to take into account 
variations over time and between households in the general level of household consumption. As 
robustness, I also consider a larger set of variables including household demographic and socioeconomic 
variables: household size, the age range of the household reference person (available in three categories: 
18-34, 35-64, 65+), a dummy to indicate whether the household includes migrants and a dummy 
indicating whether there is at least one graduate in the household. Information about the presence of 
migrant is useful for taking into account cultural-related food preferences and fasting periods related to 
religion while the presence of a graduate in the household is useful to take into account both the 
availability and the ability to process information, which may influence the dietary choices of the entire 
household. Finally, in order to take into account heterogeneity in regional consumption due to the high 
local food tradition in Italy, I also include regional fixed effects. 
Concerning subgroup analysis, I analyse heterogeneous effects across households with a different level 
of education and of health awareness. Concerning education, I analyse the differential response by 
households composed by at least one graduate vs households with no graduates, while, to assess the role 
of health awareness, I follow Shimshack et al. (2007; 2010) and I consider as health aware, the households 
with a low consumption of unhealthy items such as alcohol and tobacco, i.e. in the bottom two quintiles 
                                                             
25 Since the 2014, the ISTAT have changed the purpose of  the survey, collecting data about expenditures instead of  consumption. Moreover, 
many demographic and socio-economic variables are collected in a very different fashion. As a result, data collected in the waves before 
2014 are not directly linkable to the last two waves as explicitly indicated in the data-release documentation. 
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of the expenditure distribution for these items26. A complete description of all these variables along with 
some descriptive statistics is provided in the next Section. 
3. 1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of all variables employed in my empirical analysis. Concerning my 
outcomes, I find that an Italian household spends on average about 78 Euros per month on red meat, 
while the monthly expenditure for meat included in Group 1 and Group 2A amounts to 34 and 44 Euros, 
respectively. These expenditures represent 17%, 7%, and 10% of the total expenditure for food, 
respectively. This confirms the relevance of these items for the Italian household budgets.  
[Table 1 around here] 
 However, average data masks two important features of the expenditure for these items in Italy.  These 
are instead highlighted in Figure 2, which reports the non-parametric distribution of these expenditures. 
First, I find that the distributions are highly right-skewed. This indicates the presence of very few 
households consuming high quantities of red meat per month. Second, I find that there is a non-negligible 
share of households which did not report any expenditure for red meat (about 12% for Group 1 and 
18% for Group 2A). Both features are generally common to all households’ expenditure data through a 
log transformation of the dependent variable. An alternative estimation based on Tobit model is 
presented in Section 6.  
 
[Figure 2 around here] 
Concerning the other variables used in my analysis, Table 1 shows that households spend on average 456 
Euros per month on food and this represents about the 20% of the total monthly expenditure. In about 
20% of the households in my sample there is at least one university graduate and 4% of the households 
consist of migrants. I also find that households reporting low consumption for unhealthy items such as 
tobacco and alcohol (i.e. in the bottom two quantiles of the expenditure for these items) spend on average 
0.90 Euros per month for these items while their counterparts spend 102 Euros. 
Table 2 reports other features of the expenditure on red meat in Italy. First, it highlights the presence of 
a high regional heterogeneity in the expenditure. Regions in central Italy show higher monthly 
expenditure in red meat, exceeding by approximately 10 Euros red meat expenditure of Northern and 
Southern regions. In particular, due to the culinary traditions, Northern regions show higher monthly 
expenditure in Group 1 meat, while Group 2A meat is more highly consumed in the Southern regions. 
                                                             
26Ialso perform some sensitivity across this threshold and results are substantially unchanged (available upon request) 
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This heterogeneity confirms the need to control for regional fixed effects in my estimates. Interestingly, 
Table 2 also shows that households reporting low consumption on unhealthy items (alcohol and tobacco) 
spend less on red meat, i.e. 40 Euros less than their counterparts. 
[Table 2 around here] 
Figure 3 shows a last interesting feature of the red meat expenditure in Italy, i.e. a strong seasonality. In 
particular, it emerges that the expenditure is higher in the second and fourth quarter and lower in the first 
and third quarter of the year. This is likely due to two factors. First, higher expenditure is coincident with 
the two important Catholic holidays such as Easter and Christmas. In these periods, Italian households 
cook traditional meals based on red meat, in particular lamb and cured meat, and this explains the peak 
in consumption during these periods. Second, lower consumption during the summer time (June-
September) is likely to be due to the hot temperatures, which make fresh meals based on fruits and 
vegetables more desirable. An interesting feature of this pattern is that it is highly constant across years. 
Indeed, Figure 3 shows that monthly and seasonal variations in red meat expenditure are substantially 
the same in the last two pre-treatment years, i.e. 2013 and 2014. Similar patterns emerge also for other 
health behaviours such as smoking (Del Bono and Vuri 2017) and it represents a useful source of 
identification of the causal effects of the WHO warning, as I will show in the next Section. 
[Figure 3 around here] 
 
4. Identification strategy 
 
The identification of the effect of the warning on red meat consumption in my setting requires us to 
address two main challenges. The first challenge is the possible presence of a long-term trend in red meat 
consumption. Such a trend -especially if negative- would lead to an overestimate of the impact of the 
warning in a simple before-after framework, as it would confound the effect of the warning with the 
“natural” trend in red meat consumption. my data released on a monthly basis should allow us to control 
for this issue since I might compare expenditure variation over a very small window around the time of 
the release of the warning (i.e. one month before and after the warning) and thus deal with eventual long-
term trend effects.27 However, a potential threat to this strategy might be represented by the existence of 
a specific shift in red meat consumption after October - other than the one caused by the warning - which 
                                                             
27 It is important to note that in the short period to which my analysis refers to, the price of  red meat was substantially unchanged . 
According to the official statistics provided by ISTAT, in the 3 months following the WHO ’s warning the price index comprising red 
meat reports an average reduction of  0.2% compared to the previous months and an increase of  0.1% compared to the same period 
of  the previous year. These very small variations are then not likely to affect my results. 
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may bias my effect of interest.  To deal with this possibility I exploit the strong seasonality in red meat 
consumption in Italy mainly associated with culinary traditions in occasion of catholic holidays 
celebrations, as documented in Section 3. 
We take into account these two features in a generalized differences-in-differences framework in which 
variations in red meat expenditure over a small window around the release of the WHO warning (October 
2015) are compared with the variations in the same period of the previous year which actually act as a 
“control group”. A similar identification strategy –but using a larger window around the event- has 
already been employed in other policy-evaluation frameworks dealing with seasonal effects (i.e. Del Bono 
and Vuri 2017). An appealing feature of this approach is the possibility of inspect both graphically and 
with placebo regressions the credibility of the common trend assumption. In my case, this would require 
a parallel variation in red meat consumption in the months just before and after October over the pre-
treatment years. Figure 3 discussed in Section 3 already anticipated that this assumption can be credibly 
maintained in my setting since seasonal variations in red meat expenditures exhibit a very similar pattern 
across years. To check this assumption more carefully, in Figure 4Icompare variations in expenditure in 
November (one month after the warning) with average expenditures in the period January-October in 
pre-treatment years, i.e. in the 2014 and 2013. Figure 4 shows that these variations are effectively 
“parallel” , i.e. very similar in 2014 and 2013 and this is found for both kinds of red meat (Group 1 and 
Group 2A) and also when expenditure for all kinds of red meat is jointly considered. By contrast, 
significant deviation to this pattern are found in 2015 -the treatment year- as a result of the warning 
release. This anticipates the existence of a negative and significant consumer response to the WHO 
warning.  
[Figure 4 around here] 
In order to further check the validity of this identification assumption, I also perform several placebo 
regressions using fake warning periods of different length and I implement randomization tests based on 
simulated placebo warnings for non-parametric inference. Results are reported in Section 6 and support 
the validity of my identification strategy.  
More formally, I estimate the following empirical model: 
𝐿𝑛(Meat)my =  Tmyβ + θm + γy + umy  (1) 
Where the dependent variable is the log of household’s expenditure on red meat, Group 1 or Group 2A 
meat in the month m of the year y, respectively. θm are month fixed effects capturing monthly variations 
in expenditure- independently of the year of the interview- while γy are year fixed effects capturing 
variations across years in expenditures. Tmy is my treatment variable and β is the corresponding 
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coefficient measuring the impact of the warning on red meat expenditure. As discussed in the 
introduction, I also aim to distinguish short vs long run effects of the warning. The Tmy is thus accordingly 
adapted in different specifications to consider from 1, 2, 5 months and up to one year after October 
2015, respectively28.  
In my baseline specification, I also include the total amount of food expenditure as control in equation 
(1). Alternative specifications includes a larger set of variables, i.e. the household size, the age category of 
the head of the household, the presence of at least a university graduate in the household and whether 
the household includes, as discussed in Section 3. I estimate equation (1) using OLS estimator. An 





5.1 Short-term effects 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimates of the generalized DiD model described in Equation (1) for 
Red meat, Group 1 and Group 2A meat, respectively. All estimates refer to the short-term effect of the 
WHO’s warning, i.e. one month after the warning took place. In columns 1-3Ireport the estimates of the 
treatment effect without controls, while in columns 4-6Ireport the estimates of the treatment effect with 
control variables. For all the outcomes of interest, I report estimates that include standard errors clustered 
at month level that are robust to correlated monthly shocks in red meat expenditure. However, in Section 
6Idemonstrate that my results are robust also to different approaches to statistical inference (block-
bootstrap and randomisation tests based on simulated placebo warnings).     
[Table 3 around here] 
A comparison between columns 1-3 and 4-6 demonstrates that the estimates of the average treatment 
effect are substantially unchanged when covariates are included. This gives further confidence to the 
validity of my quasi-experimental design. Table 3 shows that the WHO’s warning had a strongly 
significant impact on consumers’ behaviour in the short-term. In fact, in the first month after the 
treatment, consumers responded to the warning by reducing expenditure on red meat by about 5% 
(4.9%). Interestingly, the reduction for probably carcinogenic meat (Group 2A) was higher than the one 
                                                             
28For this reason I opted to illustrate my estimation equation using a more flexible generalized diff-in-diff  formula. 
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observed for carcinogenic meat (Group 1), amounting on average to 7.4% and 3.2%, respectively. This 
pattern is likely due to the fact that the news was mainly conveyed through mass-media as a generic “red 
meat danger” and this induced consumers to reduce especially the consumption of the most known red 
meats such as beef, pork, lamb and goat. However, as will be shows in the next sub-section, this pattern 
is highly heterogeneous across households as more educated and health aware families interpreted the 
warning more correctly, especially in the long-run.  
With respect to the control variables, I find that larger households are associated with higher expenditure 
on red meat, as expected; while, households with at least one university-graduated member spend on 
average about 10%, 8% and 14% less than less educated households on red, Group 1 and Group 2A 
meat, respectively. This might be due to a preliminary knowledge around the dangers caused by an excess 
of red meat consumption which is strengthened by the first research outcomes reporting a correlation 
between red meat consumption and some kinds of cancer available since 2011 (see the discussion in 
Section 2). Concerning age, I find that households with an older head of the household spend more on 
red meat, in particular for what concerns Group 2A meat, for which they spend on average about 12% 
more than their counterparts. This might be indicative of some cohort effects in red meat consumption. 
Lastly, as expected, I find that households with migrants are associated with a lower expenditure on red 
meat and this is likely due to different dietary habits and possibly also related to religious beliefs for some 
sub-groups of migrants, e.g. Muslims.  
5.2 Long-term and heterogeneous effects 
In Table 4, I report the estimates of the long-term effect of the warning on households’ red meat 
expenditure. Estimates are based on the same equation described in equation (1) and include the same 
set of controls but employs a longer post-warning observational period including estimates at two 
months, five months and one year after the WHO warning, respectively.  
[Table 4 around here] 
Remarkably, I find that the treatment effect coefficients are negative but never statistically significant at 
conventional levels in the following months after the release of the warning. This result is consistent 
across all my outcomes. It is important to observe that testing for the effect up to one year after the 
warning and accounting for seasonality allows us to reduce any concern about the fact that this result 
might be influenced by festivity bias and new year’s resolutions which might play a role in the adoption 
of any kind of health behaviour, as already shown by other papers (e.g. Del Bono and Vuri 2017 for 
smoking; Cherchye et al. 2017 for food purchases). Moreover, for sake of brevity, I report in Table 4 only 
results for two, five months and one year after the warning but additional analyses exclude the presence 
of any significant treatment effect from two months and up to one year after the release of the warning 
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(results available upon request). Overall, this indicates the presence of a negative causal effect of the 
warning limited to one month after its release while levels of expenditure in red meat came back to 
before-warning average levels just two months after its release.  
However, these results apply only for the average household and they are indeed extremely heterogeneous 
across different sub-groups of households, as shown in Tables 5-7. In these Tables, I report both the 
short and long term estimates of the treatment effects of the WHO’s warning for different types of 
households characterized by a different educational level and health awareness. In particular, in the first two 
rows of each table I report treatment effect estimates for households with at least one university-
graduated component versus households with no graduate member. As a short-hand I refer to these 
groups as High-educated versus Low-educated households in the Tables. In the third and fourth columns 
of Tables 5-7Ireport estimates for households with a high versus low health awareness (High-aware and 
Low-aware as a short-hand in the Tables), i.e. households in the top versus bottom two quintiles of 
unhealthy items expenditure such as and alcohol and tobacco. For the sake of brevity, I report in Tables 
5-7 only the coefficient measuring the treatment effect. Estimates are based on the same specification 
discussed so far and includes the same set of controls with the obvious exception of the variables used 
for sample stratification (i.e. education in the case of comparison between high vs low educated 
households). 
[Tables 5, 6, 7 around here] 
Concerning education, I find that high-educated households had a stronger and more stable response to 
the warning. my estimates suggest that these households reduced the expenditure on red meat by about 
14% in the first month after the warning, as indicated in Table 5. This reduction is found to be fairly 
stable over time being equal to about 9% in a span that covers up to one year later the release of the 
warning. This pattern suggests a sort of permanent shift in red meat consumption for these households. 
Furthermore, a comparison of results reported in Tables 6 and  Table 7 suggests that while in the first 
month after the warning the reduction was higher for Group 2A meat- in line with the “average 
household” (as discussed in Section 5.1)- the pattern changes quite substantially when considering long-
term effects. Indeed, consumption shifts points towards a higher and stable reduction of carcinogenic 
Group 1 meat (about 5 Euros in a span that covers up to one year later) and non-significant variations 
for group 2A meat expenditure. This suggests that high-educated families took time to go deeper into 
the warning and were able to process the information accurately. This has led to a stable reduction in the 
more dangerous meat especially in the long run in a way which is consistent with the contents of the 
WHO warning.  This result is not found for low-educated families who instead reduced the generic red 
meat consumption only in the first month and returned to before-warning expenditure levels just two 
months after the release of the warning, as shown in the second row of Table 5.  
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A similar pattern emerges from the comparison of the effects of the warning between households with a 
different degree of health awareness. In order to explore the pure role of health awareness on consumers’ 
response I include household’s education level (i.e. the presence of a university graduate in the household) 
among the set of controls in these estimates. Table 5 shows that Low-aware households had a large 
reduction of red meat expenditure only in the first month after the warning (about 9 Euros), in line with 
the average household. On the other hand, High-aware households had an enduring reduction in red 
meat expenditure, i.e. a constant monthly reduction of about 3 Euros in a span that covers up to one year 
following the release of the warning. Interestingly, reduction for High-aware households was mostly 
concentrated on the meat labelled as carcinogen by the WHO (Group 1), as indicated in table 6. 
Conversely, Low-aware households exhibit a higher reduction among more generic and less dangerous 
red meat (group 2A) and this is found also in the long run (see Table 7). This indicates, in line with what 
I observed for education, that health awareness had an impact not only on the magnitude and the stability 
of the consumption shift but also on the correct adherence to the WHO suggestions.  
 
6. Robustness checks  
 
In this section, I perform a number of checks to test the validity of my identification strategy. As a first 
check, I focus on the plausibility of the common trend assumption. Figure 3 reported in Section 3 already 
has shown a seasonality in meat consumption, which was constant across years. A direct consequence of 
this pattern is that expenditure variations between November and previous months of the year are 
effectively parallel across time, as shown in Figure 4 of Section 4. Graphical analysis then leads us to be 
confident about the credibility of common trend assumption in my setting. However, to give even more 
credence to this assumption, I also replicate the estimates of my Diff-in-Diff regression based on the 
specification introduced in equation (1) but with “fake warning” periods. In Table 8Ireport placebo DiD 
estimates assuming a fake warning occurred in October 2014, i.e. exactly one year before the real warning, 
and using the same post observational period employed for short and long term treatment effects 
reported in Section 5. We, thus, basically compare the red meat expenditure in the months before the 
fake warning with periods of up to one year later than the fake warning while accounting for seasonality 
in red meat expenditure. As expected, the DiD estimates in Table 8 show that treatment variable are 
never statistically significant alongside all my outcomes and, interestingly, for all post observational period 
considered (one, two, five months and up to one year later). The coefficients of the control variables are 
instead very comparable to the ones found in the main regressions reported in Section 5.  
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We also repeated the same exercise dating the fake warning to two years before, i.e. October 2013, and 
using a post-observational period of the same length, i.e. up to one year later than the fake warning. Also 
in this case I do not detect any statistically significant treatment effect. Moreover, I do not detect any 
significant effect also when performing placebo DiD estimates on the subgroup of households 
considered for heterogeneous treatment effect estimates as in Section 5.2. (Results are available upon 
request).  
As a second check, I explore the robustness of my results to assumptions about the structure of the error 
distribution. Indeed, inference in DiD setting might be problematic especially in the presence of a small 
number of clusters (Bertrand et al., 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007). In my analysis, given the seasonality 
of the red meat expenditure, the month seems to be the most appropriate level at which to cluster the 
standard errors. This is the strategy I effectively adopted for the regressions shown in Section 5. 
Technically, these standard errors are consistent provided that there is a sufficiently large number of 
clusters. Despite the literature does not offer conclusive evidence around the sufficient number of cluster 
do draw credible inference, 12 clusters might be effectively “at the boundary”. In Table A1 in the 
Appendix, I show that my results are statistically significant at conventional levels also when based on 
bootstrapped standard errors clustered at the monthly level (with 200 replications). However, even non-
parametric inference based on bootstrapped standard errors might not be entirely reliable with only 12 
clusters. Thus, to rule out any possible concern, I follow Bertrand et al. (2004) and I implemented a 
randomization test based on placebo warnings. Essentially, I randomly select a set of different periods 
(month x year) for simulating the treatment effect of “fake warnings” and estimate my generalised DiD 
by using the placebo fake warnings in place of the real one. This process is repeated 2000 times and the 
estimated coefficients from permutation tests based on Monte Carlo simulations are stored in order to 
plot the non-parametric distribution of placebo warnings. The main assumption behind this test is that, 
on average, the fake warning should not generate any effect on the households’ red meat expenditure, 
since the months of treatment effects are randomly chosen.  
Figure 5 shows the kernel density distributions of the coefficients generated by the simulation process 
explained above for my outcomes of interest: red meat, Group 1 and Group 2A meat. As it is possible 
to observe, the means of the distributions are virtually zero, which implies that estimator of placebo effect 
is unbiased. More importantly, average treatment effects I estimate for the real WHO’s warning (4.9% 
for red meat, 3.2% for Group 1 and 7.4% for Group 2A as shown in Section 5) fall in the very extreme 
tails of the distribution of placebo effects. This provides further confidence that the effect I estimated 
was not observed by chance and therefore reduces any concern about the fact that my results might be 
incorrect due to invalid assumption on the standard errors distribution. 
[Figure 5 around here] 
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Lastly, I employ a Tobit estimator to check the consistency of my results with respect to the excess of 
zeros problem, a common alternative in the empirical literature on the analysis of expenditure data (e.g. 
Donkers et al. 2017, for charity expenditure; Tansel and Bircan 2006, for education expenditure; and Cai 
1998, for food expenditure).Estimates are reported in Table 9 and result to be qualitatively unchanged 
when compared to my main estimates.  
[Table 9 around here] 
The coefficients of the Tobit model encompass both changes in the probability of having positive 
expenditure on red meat and changes in red meat expenditure for those with a positive expenditure in 
red meat. Thus , I apply the decomposition method suggested by McDonald and Moffitt (1980) which 
allows us to assess the relative weight of these two effects. I find that 73% of the total change in 
expenditure on red meat was generated by marginal changes in the value of positive expenditures, whereas 
27% was generated by changes in the probability of spending anything at all for red meat. This is 
consistent with the contents of the WHO warning which was that of reducing rather than eliminating 
red meat consumption. These effects are 65% and 35% for Group 1 and 60% and 40% for Group 2A, 
respectively29.  Interestingly, this indicates that warning seems to have increased more the proportion of 
consumers who do not consume any quantity of less dangerous red meat (Group 2A) than carcinogenic 





In this chapter, I have investigated the consequences on consumers’ behaviour of World Health 
Organization’s warning concerning the carcinogen effect of the red meat consumption released in 
October 2015. I investigated this topic in Italy due to its the long-lasting attention towards food quality 
and Mediterranean diet but also for the availability of good data collecting expenditures for a large and 
representative sample of Italian Households on monthly basis and with rich information on household 
characteristics. Monthly data allow us to compare households’ expenditure variation in a very narrow 
window across the delivery of the WHO warning and thus to rule out long-term trends in consumption. 
                                                             
29 Mc Donald and Moffit (1980) decompose the total effect of  a determinant 𝑿𝒊 in a tobit model as: 𝜹𝑬𝒚/𝜹𝑿𝒊  =  𝑭(𝒛)( 𝜹𝑬𝒚
∗/𝜹𝑿𝒊 )  +
 𝑬𝒚∗( 𝜹𝑭(𝒛)/ 𝜹𝑿𝒊), where 𝑭(𝒛) is the share of  observations with non-zero expenditures, 𝜹𝑬𝒚
∗/𝜹𝑿𝒊  is the impact of  the determinant 
on the expenditure above zero, 𝑬𝒚∗is the average positive expenditure and 𝜹𝑭(𝒛)/ 𝜹𝑿𝒊 is the impact of  the determinant on the 
probability of  any expenditure. In the case of  red meat, the decomposition is 𝟓. 𝟐𝟒 = ( 𝟎. 𝟗𝟑 ∗ 𝟑. 𝟗) + ( 𝟖𝟎. 𝟗 ∗ 𝟎. 𝟎𝟐). Thus, the 
first term (0.93*3.9)/5.24) accounts for 73% of  the final coefficient, while the remaining 27% is explained by the second term 
(80.9*0.02/5.24). Same procedure was applied for the other outcomes 
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Moreover, I exploit a very nice feature of red meat consumption in Italy which is the presence of a strong 
seasonality in consumption mainly associated with culinary traditions in occasion of catholic holidays 
celebrations. I combine both features in a difference-in-differences framework that allows to retrieve the 
causal effect of the warning on red meat expenditure under the hypothesis of common trend in 
expenditure over the same period of the year, which seems to be largely supported in my case. 
Additionally, the availability of data up until one year after the warning and detailed information around 
household’s characteristics and expenditures allows us to analyse both the short and the long-run effect 
of the WHO warning and their variation across different consumers’ subgroups. 
Using the Household Budget Survey (HBS), my analysis leads to three important findings. Firstly, I find 
that WHO’s warning had a strongly significant impact on consumer’s behaviour but only in the very 
short-term. In fact, I find that in the first month after the warning, consumers reduced their expenditure 
on red meat by around 5%, 3.2% and 7.4% of the average monthly expenditure in generic red meat, in 
carcinogenic meat (Group 1) and in probably carcinogenic meat (Group 2A), respectively. However, 
expenditures on red meat returned to pre-warning levels just two months after its release. Secondly, I 
find that only some subgroups, such as the more educated and health aware changed their eating 
behaviours in the long run, i.e. over a one year post-warning observational period. On the contrary, poor-
educated and less health-aware households reduced the consumption in a less significant manner and 
only in the very short-term. Thirdly, I also find that these groups differ significantly with respect to the 
correct interpretation of the warning. More educated and health-aware households reduced especially the 
consumption of carcinogenic meat (Group 1) while their counterparts reduced mostly the consumption 
of relatively less dangerous meat (Group 2A). This pattern is likely due to the fact that the news was 
mainly conveyed through mass-media as a generic “red meat danger” and this induced these kinds of 
consumers to reduce particularly their consumption of the most common but relatively less dangerous 
red meats such as beef, pork, lamb and goat.  
These results contribute to three different strands of the literature and offer potentially very relevant 
implications around the design of food warning policies. Firstly, I contribute to a large volume of 
literature exploring the effects of health authorities’ announcement on households’ consumption 
patterns. I add to this literature by demonstrating that the effect of an announcement might be very 
different in the short versus long run and highly heterogeneous across subgroups of consumers. Secondly, 
I report causal evidence on the effect of health information on risk-taking decisions in a quasi-
experimental setting. This topic has been addressed by other papers based on observational data which 
however cannot tackle the endogeneity between the consumers’ efforts to acquire information and their 
behaviours. Thirdly, I contribute to the literature exploring the distributive consequences of new 
technology introduction or information availability. In line with this literature, I confirm that education 
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plays a significant role in the responsiveness to health warnings. This indicates that both the stock of 
information and the ability to process it are factors which contribute to shaping health inequalities in a 
substantial way. However, I also find a new-brand driver of the health-education gradient. Indeed, 
education along with the health awareness are found to be the drivers of a stable, more accurate -and not 
just higher- consumption shift in response to the informational shock. This offers a perhaps more 
pessimistic view on the possibility of contrasting health inequalities through educational campaigns 
especially when the aim is to change behaviours in a permanent way. 
In terms of policy, my paper has a number of implications for the successful design of health advices. 
Firstly, the fact that the consumers - on average- only responded in the immediate short-term suggests 
that successful health information policies should be designed in a way that expose the individual to a 
constant flow of information. This is likely to be more beneficial compared to the “one-shot” warnings. 
A real-world example of these policies is represented by the anti-smoking advice campaigns, which are 
delivered quite constantly, and through different formats. Secondly, the misinterpretation of the warnings 
by some subgroups suggests the importance of re-designing the health warnings in a simpler and more 
accessible way. In this respect, a higher involvement of health care providers in dissemination of health 
warnings might be beneficial. Other than being a likely cost-effective strategy to increase general 
adherence to the health warnings, as argued by Chaloupka et al., (2011), this might also have the spillover 
effect of reducing the information gap between more and less educated. Finally, my findings confirm the 
strategic role played by education for health. Other than to reduce the well-known health gap, my finding 
indirectly suggests also that education is able to increase the health returns on investments in health 
campaigns and health educational activities since the latter are misinterpreted by low educated individuals 
and produce only short-term effects among them. In a general equilibrium perspective, higher 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. 
    
Dependent variables    
Red Meat Monthly expenditure on Red meat 78.29 69.98 
Group 1 Monthly expenditure on Group 1 meat 34.00 32.73 
Group 2A Monthly expenditure on Group 2A meat 44.29 49.48 
    
Controls/Subgroups    
Food expenditure Monthly expenditure on food 456.54 304.48 
HH size Household size 2.35 1.22 
High-Educated At least one graduate in the household (share) 0.21 0.40 
Age Age category of the household’s respondent 18-34 (7%) 
35-64 (55%)  
>64 (38%) 
 
Migrant At least one migrant in the household (share) 0.043 0.20 
High-aware Average expenditure of households in the 
bottom two quintiles of Tobacco and Alcohol 
expenditure 
175.48 82.17 
    
All expenditure values are expressed in Euros 
 
Table 2. Meat expenditure by subgroup: mean values 
 Red Meat Group1 Group 2A 
All 78.29           34.00  44.29  
North  76.68 35.46  41.22 
Centre 85.42 36.11  49.31  
South 75.74  30.73  45.00  
High Education 82.79  36.37  46.42  
Low Education 77.12  33.38  43.73  
High-aware 99.16  42.68  56.47  
Low-aware 58.11  25.48  32.63  











Table 3. DiD estimates of the effect of the warning on meat expenditure: short-term effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Red Group 1 Group 2A Red Group 1 Group 2A 
       
Treatment -0.0491*** -0.0320*** -0.0742*** -0.0478*** -0.0313*** -0.0722*** 
 0.0056 0.0083 0.0091 0.0055 0.0080 0.0091 
       
Food Exp. 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0017*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0016*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
       
H Size    0.0527*** 0.0530*** 0.0502*** 
    0.0022 0.0032 0.0032 
       
High-Educ.    -0.1049*** -0.0833*** -0.1388*** 
    0.0073 0.0088 0.0092 
       
HH Age 35-65     0.0241** -0.0025 0.0525** 
    0.0090 0.0109 0.0187 
       
HH Age>65    0.0446*** -0.0424** 0.1239*** 
    0.0127 0.0147 0.0198 
       
Migrant    -0.1503*** -0.2204*** -0.1054*** 
    0.0130 0.0188 0.0180 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 30852 30852 30852 30852 30852 30852 
OLS estimates of Equation (1). Clustered standard errors at month level in italics. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 










Table 4. DiD estimates of the effect of the warning on meat expenditure: long-term effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
          
  Red   Group 1   Group 2A  
          
 2-month 5-month 1-year 2-month 5-month 1-year 2-month 5-month 1-year 
          
Treatment -0.0136 -0.0137 -0.0141 0.0038 0.0039 0.0038 -0.0322 -0.0325 -0.0330 
 0.0230 0.0231 0.0226 0.0243 0.0244 0.0238 0.0278 0.0277 0.0275 
          
Food Exp. 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0012*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
          
H size 0.0528*** 0.0513*** 0.0515*** 0.0522*** 0.0503*** 0.0503*** 0.0509*** 0.0498*** 0.0498*** 
 0.0021 0.0026 0.0022 0.0032 0.0033 0.0036 0.0032 0.0033 0.0028 
          
High-Educ. -0.1081*** -0.1095*** -0.1093*** -0.0871*** -0.0881*** -0.0940*** -0.1411*** -0.1433*** -0.1385*** 
 0.0074 0.0072 0.0067 0.0079 0.0078 0.0081 0.0093 0.0094 0.0094 
          
HH Age 34-64 0.0310** 0.0309** 0.0342** 0.0017 0.0034 0.0036 0.0602** 0.0601** 0.0685*** 
 0.0133 0.0123 0.0118 0.0118 0.0105 0.0087 0.0215 0.0198 0.0172 
          
HH Age>65 0.0518*** 0.0519*** 0.0542*** -0.0399** -0.0397** -0.0396*** 0.1336*** 0.1345*** 0.1430*** 
 0.0166 0.0154 0.0130 0.0150 0.0139 0.0109 0.0239 0.0219 0.0187 
          
Migrant -0.1450*** -0.1387*** -0.1412*** -0.2145*** -0.2051*** -0.2039*** -0.1019*** -0.0968*** -0.1022*** 
 0.0147 0.0131 0.0101 0.0210 0.0209 0.0158 0.0173 0.0145 0.0158 
          
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
N 32782 35814 45837 32782 35814 45837 32782 35814 45837 




Table 5. DiD estimates of the effect warning on red meat expenditure: heterogeneous effects 
OLS estimates coefficients of treatment effect of Equation (1). Full set of controls included. Clustered standard errors at 
month level in italics. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Table 6. DiD estimates of the effects warning on Group 1 meat expenditure: heterogeneous effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 1-year 
       
High-Educ. -0.0780*** -0.0678*** -0.0679*** -0.0669*** -0.0676*** -0.0682*** 
 0.0154 0.0163 0.0162 0.0161 0.0159 0.0153 
       
Low-Educ. -0.0208** 0.0227 0.0228 0.0227 0.0227 0.0231 
 0.0088 0.0300 0.0301 0.0302 0.0302 0.0297 
       
Low-aware -0.0660*** -0.0119 -0.0119 -0.0122 -0.0126 -0.0124 
 0.0143 0.0355 0.0355 0.0354 0.0353 0.0349 
       
High-aware -0.0206** -0.0233** -0.0227** -0.0228** -0.0228** -0.0226** 
 0.0089 0.0087 0.0088 0.0089 0.0089 0.0092 
       
OLS estimates coefficients of treatment effect of Equation (1). Full set of controls included. Clustered standard errors at 
month level in italics. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 1-year 
       
High-Educ. -0.1430*** -0.0882** -0.0882** -0.0871** -0.0879** -0.0890** 
 0.0114 0.0367 0.0365 0.0365 0.0364 0.0362 
       
Low-Educ. -0.0254*** 0.0048 0.0048 0.0048 0.0047 0.0048 
 0.0069 0.0212 0.0212 0.0212 0.0213 0.0210 
       
Low-aware -0.0836*** -0.0300 -0.0301 -0.0301 -0.0305 -0.0316 
 0.0117 0.0336 0.0335 0.0335 0.0336 0.0332 
       
High-aware -0.0281*** -0.0352*** -0.0349*** -0.0351*** -0.0351*** -0.0349*** 
 0.0085 0.0094 0.0095 0.0096 0.0095 0.0095 
       
101 
 
Table 7. DiD estimates of the effect of the warning on Group 2A meat expenditure: heterogeneous 
effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 1-month 2-month 3-month 4-month 5-month 1-year 
       
High-Educ. -0.1980*** -0.1059 -0.1059 -0.1049 -0.1062 -0.1069 
 0.0139 0.0609 0.0606 0.0606 0.0607 0.0604 
       
Low-Educ. -0.0430*** -0.0153 -0.0155 -0.0153 -0.0155 -0.0157 
 0.0110 0.0217 0.0217 0.0216 0.0217 0.0217 
       
Low-aware -0.1061*** -0.0467 -0.0469 -0.0466 -0.0472 -0.0492 
 0.0143 0.0375 0.0373 0.0374 0.0376 0.0371 
       
High-aware -0.0554*** -0.0573*** -0.0573*** -0.0577*** -0.0578*** -0.0571*** 
 0.0136 0.0134 0.0135 0.0137 0.0137 0.0138 
       
OLS estimates coefficients of treatment effect of Equation (1). Full set of controls included. Clustered standard errors at 





























Table 8. Robustness checks. Placebo tests for fake warning periods 
 
 OLS estimates of Equation (1) for fake warning (October 2014). Full set of controls included. Clustered standard errors at month level in italics. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
  Red meat   Group 1   Group 2A  
 1-month 2-month 5-month 1-year 1-month 2-month 5-mont 1-year 1-month 2-month 5-mont 1-year 
             
Treatment 0.0043 -0.0094 -0.0098 -0.0101 -0.0042 -0.0267 -0.0269 -0.0267 0.0038 -0.0008 -0.0014 -0.0018 
 0.0044 0.0114 0.0112 0.0116 0.0087 0.0194 0.0191 0.0186 0.0075 0.0083 0.0081 0.0085 
             
Food Exp. 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0017*** 0.0017*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
             
H Size 0.0419*** 0.0423*** 0.0433*** 0.0445*** 0.0491*** 0.0490*** 0.0493*** 0.0508*** 0.0351*** 0.0359*** 0.0375*** 0.0388*** 
 0.0032 0.0030 0.0030 0.0024 0.0031 0.0030 0.0028 0.0029 0.0055 0.0053 0.0048 0.0038 
             
High Educ. -0.0428*** -0.0450*** -0.0503*** -0.0572*** -0.0166* -0.0154* -0.0191** -0.0312*** -0.0675*** -0.0723*** -0.0809*** -0.0854*** 
 0.0072 0.0067 0.0054 0.0049 0.0077 0.0074 0.0065 0.0065 0.0108 0.0103 0.0085 0.0080 
             
HH Age 35-64 0.0155* 0.0193* 0.0187** 0.0221*** 0.0008 0.0027 0.0015 0.0054 0.0263* 0.0312** 0.0315** 0.0352** 
 0.0077 0.0090 0.0080 0.0066 0.0142 0.0146 0.0129 0.0093 0.0138 0.0140 0.0121 0.0144 
             
HH Age>65 0.0421*** 0.0466*** 0.0445*** 0.0467*** -0.0420*** -0.0379** -0.0419** -0.0366*** 0.0991*** 0.1041*** 0.1026*** 0.1049*** 
 0.0084 0.0096 0.0087 0.0073 0.0134 0.0152 0.0141 0.0113 0.0162 0.0158 0.0139 0.0145 
             
HH Migrant -0.1552*** -0.1507*** -0.1607*** -0.1484*** -0.2963*** -0.2794*** -0.2858*** -0.2735*** -0.0916*** -0.0925*** -0.1041*** -0.0834*** 
 0.0124 0.0122 0.0114 0.0120 0.0211 0.0264 0.0267 0.0206 0.0154 0.0140 0.0139 0.0164 
             




Figure 1. Google trends for “carne rossa” (red meat) in Italy, 2004-2018 
 
Own elaboration on Google trends data.  Google trends data for News are only available from 2008. 
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Table A1. DiD estimates of the effect of the warning on meat expenditure: short-term effects 
(Bootstrapped standard errors) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Red Group 1 Group 2A Red Group 1 Group 2A 
       
Treatment -0.0491*** -0.0320*** -0.0742*** -0.0478*** -0.0313*** -0.0722*** 
 0.0053 0.0081 0.0082 0.0050 0.0083 0.0089 
       
Food Exp. 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0017*** 0.0014*** 0.0012*** 0.0016*** 
 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
       
HH size    0.0527*** 0.0530*** 0.0502*** 
    0.0017 0.0028 0.0029 
       
High Educ.    -0.1049*** -0.0833*** -0.1388*** 
    0.0051 0.0088 0.0076 
       
HH Age 35-65    0.0241*** -0.0025 0.0525*** 
    0.0074 0.0100 0.0160 
       
HH Age>65    0.0446*** -0.0424*** 0.1239*** 
    0.0110 0.0135 0.0158 
       
Migrant    -0.1503*** -0.2204*** -0.1054*** 
    0.0118 0.0169 0.0148 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 30852 30852 30852 30852 30852 30852 
OLS estimates coefficients of treatment effect of Equation (1). Full set of controls included.  Bootstrapped standard errors 













This thesis investigated the two-way relationships between income and health and tried to disentangle 
the main mechanisms of transmissions of related inequalitiesIt analyses both distributional aspect of 
income - focusing on the top tail of income distribution and in particular on those individuals who get 
high earnings in the labour market (i.e. the so-called working super-rich)- and the socioeconomic gradient 
in health both in the top tails and in the rest of the distribution. The thesis consists of three chapters.  
The first chapter focuses on the determinants that allow some individuals to receive extraordinary 
earnings in labour markets compared to their peers, i.e. CEO or the superstars of sport, music and 
cinema. Specifically, it empirically analyses the effects of performance, popularity and bargaining power 
on the earnings of the universe of football players of Italian Serie A. Disposing of original panel data 
allows to investigate the returns of performance, popularity and bargaining power while controlling for 
players and team unobserved heterogeneity. Moreover, I employ the Unconditional Quantile Regression 
approach developed by Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009) to estimate the impact of a marginal change in 
the determinants of earnings on their entire distribution. This is relevant because players’ earnings exhibit 
a large dispersion around the mean and investigating the role of the determinants is especially interesting 
at the top of the earnings distribution, where superstar effects should more clearly manifest. Main results 
show that all the aforementioned factors significantly affect the players’ earnings. However, the analysis 
“beyond the mean” reveals that the role played by popularity increases at the top of earnings distribution 
being the main determinant of the “superstars”. In particular, I find that popularity dominates all the 
other covariates at the top tail of the earnings distribution and reaches its peak at the 95th percentile of 
this distribution. An increase in a player’s popularity is magnified by an earning premium of approximately 
35% at its maximum point, according to my estimates. Conversely, the role of bargaining power reaches 
its peak around the 75th percentile, generating an earnings premium of approximately 14%, but it is not 
statistically associated with the earnings of players above this threshold. The effect of performances is, 
instead, more constant and becomes relatively less important after the 75th percentile. These results 
challenge the interpretations of extraordinary earnings based only on very talented workers who “win 
and take all”. 
As mentioned above, labour market seems a fertile ground for the escalation of contemporary society’s 
extreme inequalities. Thus, understanding how the “working super-rich” respond to health shocks can 
be a key element of these dynamics. The second chapter of this thesis aims at providing evidence of the 
relationship between health shocks and labour market outcomes, focusing on those in the top tail of 
earnings distribution. Therefore, the dataset presented above has been enriched with data about the 
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nature and the incidence of the injuries suffered by the universe of Serie A football players. In particular, 
in this chapter, I exploit traumatic injuries as exogenous variation in professional football players’ health 
to provide estimates of the causal impact of a health shock on two main labour market outcomes: the 
annual net wages and the probability of changing the terms of the contract between the employer (the 
club) and the employee (the player).  
 The empirical approach employs panel fixed effects models combined with an IV strategy, which uses 
the average number of yellow cards received by the team as an instrument. Main results show that 
working super-rich are not immune to economics consequences of health shocks and can be summarised 
as follow. Firstly, health shocks have a strong negative effect on the wages of the professional football 
players of the Italian Serie A. In particular, having a 30-day injury reduces the wage of the following year 
by approximately 12%. Secondly, only a residual part of the negative effect could be explained through 
the reduced performance of the players after the injury. In fact, results suggest that the largest part of the 
coefficient is explained by a direct effect of the shock on the outcome. This result can be explained in a 
framework of human capital depreciation. The club has an incentive to offer a lower wage for 
precautionary reasons, supposing that players who experienced a severe injury might incur similar injuries 
in the future. Thus, the club insures itself against this risk by reducing the fixed share of the wage, which 
is independent by performances. 
The third chapter analyses inequality and its multifaceted aspects by moving the focus from the top tail 
to the whole population. In fact, it investigates how people heterogeneously respond to public education 
policies delivering health information by using as case study the 2015 WHO warning about the 
carcinogenic effects of red meat consumption. Importantly, it exploits high frequency data, i.e. monthly 
data, about Italian households’ expenditures to identify the effect of the warning in the long vs. short 
run, for which there is no previous evidence in the literature and to document the response of households 
differing due to educational levels and health awareness. In order to identify such effect, I employ a 
Difference-in-Difference model which exploits the strong seasonality patterns in meat consumption in 
Italy, mainly associated with culinary traditions in occasion of catholic holidays celebrations. Main 
findings can be summarised in three main points. First, I find that WHO’s warning had a strongly 
significant impact on consumer’s behaviour but only in the very short-term. In fact, I find that in the first 
month after the warning, consumers reduced their expenditure on red meat by around 5%, 3.2% and 
7.4% of the average monthly expenditure in generic red meat, in carcinogenic meat and in probably 
carcinogenic meat, respectively. However, expenditures on red meat returned to pre-warning levels just 
two months after its release. Secondly, I find that only some subgroups, such as the more educated and 
health aware changed their eating behaviours in the long run, i.e. over a one year post-warning 
observational period. On the contrary, poor-educated and less health-aware households reduced the 
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consumption in a less significant manner and only in the very short-term. Thirdly, I also find that these 
groups differ significantly with respect to the correct interpretation of the warning. More educated and 
health-aware households reduced especially the consumption of carcinogenic meat while their 
counterparts reduced mostly the consumption of relatively less dangerous meat. 
These findings also have a number of implications for the successful design of health information 
policies. Firstly, the fact that the consumers - on average- only responded in the immediate short-term 
suggests that successful health information policies should be designed in a way that expose the individual 
to a constant flow of information. This is likely to be more beneficial compared to the “one-shot” 
warnings. Secondly, the misinterpretation of the warnings by some subgroups suggests the importance 
of re-designing the health warnings in a simpler and more accessible way. In this respect, a higher 
involvement of health care providers in dissemination of health warnings might be beneficial. Finally, the 
findings confirm the strategic role played by education for health. Other than to reduce the well-known 
health gap, my finding indirectly suggests also that education is able to increase the health returns on 
investments in health campaigns and health educational activities since the latter are misinterpreted by 
low educated individuals and produce only short-term effects among them. In a general equilibrium 
perspective, higher investments in education are then likely to bring both equity and efficiency gains to 
the health production process. 
 
